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Encouraging a wider viewEncouraging a wider viewPosted Oct 1, 2013 14:55 UTC (Tue) by freemars (subscriber, #4235)In reply to: Encouraging a wider view by intgr Parent article: Encouraging a wider view
Exactly. An attacker (let's call her 'Nsa') needs to decrypt packets and re-encrypt them with her faked key. And this needs to be done in real time, or Nsa's cover is blown. This is a DoS attack against Nsa.
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Encouraging a wider view Posted Oct 4, 2013 18:01 UTC (Fri) by elanthis (guest, #6227) [Link]
> And this needs to be done in real time, or Nsa's cover is blown. This is a DoS attack against Nsa.
No. The NSA just needs to store the encrypted packets and then decrypt them later at their leisure. They've already admitted to doing this in many cases.
Let's not also forget that even with a MITM attack, they aren't routing all packets to their buildings for real-time decryption. They're still injecting the code to read the unencrypted traffic into the existing infrastructure (either at the end-points or at a common existing intermediary) and then streaming that data efficiently to their data stores.
There's nothing to DoS.
Encouraging a wider view Posted Oct 4, 2013 20:06 UTC (Fri) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] No. The NSA just needs to store the encrypted packets and then decrypt them later at their leisure. That's totally different kind of attack. Almost undetectable, yes, but also millions of billion times more computationally expensive. They've already admitted to doing this in many cases. The've admitted that they keep encrypted sessions but nobody knows how many of them they can actually decrypt. And if they can “decrypt them later at their leisure” it's still “DoS attack against NSA” - just somewhat less effective. Let's not also forget that even with a MITM attack, they aren't routing all packets to their buildings for real-time decryption. It's the only way to perform a MITM attack, sorry. They're still injecting the code to read the unencrypted traffic into the existing infrastructure (either at the end-points or at a common existing intermediary) and then streaming that data efficiently to their data stores. There are no "common existing intermediary" if you, e.g. connect to Google from your home and they need permit from court to actually hack your computer. Yes, I know, they can hack Google itself and/or your computer but now we are at stage “asteroid can kill you any time thus it's pointless to watch traffic lights”.
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