freeipa: multiple vulnerabilities

[1] FreeIPA 3.0 introduced a Cross-Realm Kerberos trusts with Active Directory, a feature that allows IPA administrators to create a Kerberos trust with an AD. This allows IPA users to be able to access resources in AD trusted domains and vice versa.

When the Kerberos trust is created, an outgoing and incoming keys are stored in the IPA LDAP backend (in ipaNTTrustAuthIncoming and ipaNTTrustAuthOutgoing attributes). However, the IPA LDAP ACIs allow anonymous read acess to these attributes which could allow an unprivileged and unauthenticated user to read the keys. With these keys, an attacker could craft an invented Kerberos ticket with an invented PAC, encrypt the PAC with the retrieved key, and impersonate any AD user in the IPA domain or impersonate any IPA user in the AD domain. (CVE-2013-0199)

[2] It was found that the current default configuration of IPA servers did not publish correct CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). The default configuration specifies that every replica is to generate its own CRL, however this can result in inconsistencies in the CRL contents provided to clients from different Identity Management replicas. More specifically, if a certificate is revoked on one Identity Management replica, it will not show up on another Identity Management replica. (CVE-2012-4546)