Your analogy is very bad, because that is exactly the situation we have today, where the security community refused to handle https proxyfication, and as a result the only way to proxify traffic is to inject MITM certificates in the browser.
There is no way for the user to tell its browser "I allow this proxy to read my traffic, except for bigbank.com, and only if it presents certificate xxx, don't accept xxx for anything else". Instead you get complete MITM without any user control.
On a physical site when corporate human guards go beyond acceptable bonds you can escalate, refuse, protest, etc. But https "security" is not like this at all. Your bags are searched behind your back without any notification or limits, like in a bad spy movie. Since https designers refused to acknowledge the need for basic policing, organisations went directly to the stasi stage as a workaround.
Also note that the organisations complaining loudest about https interception (Google, Facebook, etc) are busy pushing the limits of existing laws when profiling their users, so no one is snow-white here.