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SlashdotSlashdotPosted Dec 9, 2012 6:45 UTC (Sun) by paulj (subscriber, #341)In reply to: Slashdot by Lennie Parent article: Stallman: Ubuntu Spyware: What to Do?
Forwarding would just add latency and fragility. The .'s are a fixed set (in terms of the IPs), both the . and TLDs are quite a large set in terms of # of servers. The commonly contacted ones would be cached. Also, I've seen scribblings in the IETF journal once that questioned whether hierarchy of caching achieved much in the way of gains. Finally, the .'s and TLDs can handle the additional load - anycast is a powerful tool.
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Slashdot Posted Dec 9, 2012 14:24 UTC (Sun) by Lennie (subscriber, #49641) [Link]
The average website has 14 domains linked from the first website people visit: http://httparchive.org/trends.php
You really want every device with a browser to talk to the TLD servers for each of these domains ? (yes many are the same domain: so let's say 7 per website you visit).
That's doesn't add up.
Slashdot Posted Dec 9, 2012 18:12 UTC (Sun) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]
The roots and TLDs are *more* than capable of handling requests from every device on the internet, without caching. There is a simple proof for this: They *did so* - users will regularly make typos in their browsers, queries for these non-existent domains will go out to the "." and (if the TLD is valid) to the TLDs.
Perhaps this decreased a little since browsers started diverting things typed into the address bar to search engines.
However, the fact remains that the roots and TLDs *already* get hit by queries from *every* device with an interactive user, as well as any which happen to query for some misconfigured or no longer valid hostname. The . and TLDs are *already* setup to handle this kind of load, cause they already get it.
What the intermediate caches do is:
a) Not provide effective caching (distribution of queries is very long tailed) - see e.g. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=581877 (and I think there's a more recent ISOC article that found the same thing)
b) Potentially add latency - it may take longer for your computer to get its answer.
c) Provide a huge, juicy target for attackers - a DNS poisoning attack is so much more efficient if you poison a widely shared cache.
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