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Security implications for user interface changes?Security implications for user interface changes?Posted Nov 29, 2012 18:06 UTC (Thu) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313)In reply to: Security implications for user interface changes? by mathstuf Parent article: Security implications for user interface changes?
because the people writing them are too close to the problem. As a result, they write things that are obvious to them and so they don't see a need for more documentation.
It also hurts that in many cases, the problem is actually hard, and if you tried to explain when you would want to use each option, as opposed to the terse explanations that they have, it's a very slippery slope to having books on the subject (with significant disagreements between the books over what the 'right' way to do things is)
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Security implications for user interface changes? Posted Nov 29, 2012 18:21 UTC (Thu) by mathstuf (subscriber, #69389) [Link]
I'm fine if they put "Beware: dissertations recommended" on some commands and options, but trying to find out what domain a certificate is for? If I hadn't remembered "x509" being so familiar, things would have taken a lot longer than they did (which was already too long, IMO). The certutil commands for inserting things into your nssdb are also crazy. AFAICT, you can't add the 'u' (a client-side certificate) flag to entries without actually using it as a client certificate. It's also sad when the easiest interface to your tool is the configuration pane of a browser (the Chromium family in this case).
Security implications for user interface changes? Posted Dec 3, 2012 2:25 UTC (Mon) by giraffedata (subscriber, #1954) [Link] ... it's a very slippery slope to having books on the subject You didn't finish the thought. The problem with having books on the subject is that people don't have time to read books on the subject. It's actually impossible to explain some things - the time it takes to explain it is more than a person has to listen.
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