In aviation (and some, but frustratingly not all other failure-is-death systems) once the majority of actual accidents were "freak" outliers the accident investigators began to throw effort at non-accidents in which something goes wrong but it does not result in a reportable accident. Good work on these incidents means that the next time three things would have gone wrong, you already prevented at least one of them, and everybody lives to write the story of another near miss.
The fixes that result from accidents (e.g. re-training pilots and traffic control to accept TCAS resolutions over instructions from a distant human where the two conflict, as a result of the Überlingen accident) get more headlines, but today the fixes made without a single person even getting bruised are probably just as important to safety.
For those of us lucky enough that our software can't kill anyone if it goes wrong the same approach still likely makes sense. A bug you fix today is one less bug that might contribute to the symptoms reported tomorrow. I will be surprised if this ext4 bug does not have at least two and probably more separate "fixes" that would have completely prevented any corruption, and perhaps even some of which could have been identified as correct fixes without nix even reporting the corruption in the first place.