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Linux and automotive computing securityLinux and automotive computing securityPosted Oct 10, 2012 22:44 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523)In reply to: Linux and automotive computing security by rgmoore Parent article: Linux and automotive computing security
Air gap doesn't mean complete absence of any communication. For example, a door lock system can passively listen to CAN bus for speed information messages (the design of CAN makes this easy).
So far I haven't seen an example where you really need complex two-way communication between a critical system and non-critical stuff.
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Linux and automotive computing security Posted Oct 11, 2012 14:52 UTC (Thu) by ortalo (subscriber, #4654) [Link]
A fireman with its phone wants the engine to stop (GSM -> engine).
Is that a better idea?
Anyway, I *agree* with you: first, why not try to do something good with an air gap. Once manufacturers will have demonstrated their ability to design something correct with an air gap, maybe they could be allowed to try to adress more complex configurations.
But you know, that was the way certification authorities approached the issue for airplanes and, apparently, the "non-critical -> critical" issue came back on the table within 2-3 years.
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