|| ||Corey Bryant <coreyb-AT-linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
|| ||kernel-hardening-AT-lists.openwall.com, James Morris <jmorris-AT-namei.org>,
Theodore Tso <tytso-AT-google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook-AT-chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <pmoore-AT-redhat.com>, Eric Paris <eparis-AT-redhat.com>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks-AT-canonical.com>, zohar-AT-us.ibm.com,
|| ||Linux Security Workgroup |
|| ||Thu, 27 Sep 2012 15:26:26 -0400|
|| ||Article, Thread
At the Linux Security Summit we began discussing the Linux Security
Workgroup and some of the efforts that we can focus on.
The charter of the workgroup is to provide on-going security
verification of Linux kernel subsystems in order to assist in securing
the Linux Kernel and maintain trust and confidence in the security of
the Linux ecosystem.
This may include, but is not limited to, topics such as tooling to
assist in securing the Linux Kernel, verification and testing of
critical subsystems for vulnerabilities, security improvements for build
tools, and providing guidance for maintaining subsystem security.
For communication, we have permission to use the following mail list:
The list can be subscribed to at: http://www.openwall.com/lists/#subscribe
If you would like to participate or know anyone else who would like to,
please join the mailing list or feel free to pass the word on.
The bullets below are further details based on our discussion at the
Linux Security Summit:
* The idea of the workgroup came from the Linux Foundation and Ted Tso
after the kernel.org attack.
* Malicious code wasn't inserted into the kernel tree. git hashing
would have detected a mismatch in kernel code quickly. Also the PGP web
of trust and kernel signing was an important validation measure that's
since been taken.
* Guidelines for subsystems could be created to provide guidance for
best practices to consider when reviewing code (e.g. detecting common
vulnerabilities, don't leave ssh private keys around, etc).
* Development and maintenance of automated tools would assist in
securing the kernel on an ongoing basis.
* Maintainers should have more automated tooling available to enforce
security checks on patches as they come in.
* Daily execution (perhaps on linux-next tree or as part of build
system) of static analysis and emailing reports out to a list and CC'ing
authors using git blame. Red Hat's Coverity license allows results to
be shared with the upstream project.
* Provide verification of critical kernel subsystems (Kernel build
infrastructure, Networking, Network file systems, KVM, Cryptographic
* Fuzz testing could be used to find potential problems in the kernel's
interface to userspace (syscall, ioctl, KVM paravirt calls).
* More stringent rules could be adopted such as patch signing.
* The security community should share and coordinate their efforts on
the mail list so that overlap of work items does not occur.
* We should narrow down the working group's scope and/or priorities
before we narrow down the resources.
* Perhaps allocating people for a limited amount of time that rotates
would be the most attainable resource possibility.
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