LSS: Secure Boot

You know, you kind of proved my point. There is NO added security, because you can always find another vulnerability in the kernel, and use that to escalate past the bootloader (like creating crafted restore-from-hibernation images) and people will act under the illusion that their systems have "added security" when they aren't, which, as I mentioned, diminishes the overall security. For instance, the crafted restore image could allow running unsigned or signed-by-the-malware-author executables or substitute key libraries.

And again, that is my point: "Secure Boot" == "fake security", which is far worse than "no security".

And worse yet: "Secure Boot" == "you are running a signed O.S. (with Defective by Design implications and I Can Phone Home and invade your privacy implications)" OR "you are running a signed (bla bla) but COMPROMISED by malware O.S."...