> Your "well-thought combination of network authentication (802.1x + RADIUS), traffic shaping, and maybe limited VPNs" is a deployment nightmare (and is getting worse the bigger your organisation is) which is why big orgs just use interception instead (which can be deployed easily and solves their problems even if it has ugly privacy side-effects).
This does not parse to me. We just deployed your "nightmare" to an organization with 3000 users and 5000 devices in less than a week. They select WPA2Enterprise, write their login, their password and voilà. Wired connections are managed by a combination of MAC addresses and kerberos workstation authentications (any OSes where this would be complicated are just added as exceptions and bypass the authentication but they are mapped to a physical network point, so anything funky is easy to block). Each user/device combo has access to a specific routing and traffic shaping ruleset.
Is it more difficult than "plug MITM machine after the router and use the default settings"? Yes, it is. Is it much more difficult? No. Is it safer? YES. Do orgs as big as mine and bigger just use interception instead because it is easier? Yes, but mainly it is because they are lazy and haven't seen all the consequences.
As I told you, your problem is not just "ugly privacy side-effects", but "ugly liability side-effects because once your machine decrypted my encrypted communications between me and my bank or my government you can take a peek at it". It's not that you _will_ take a peek at it. Is that if passwords/keys/confidential records get copied, you will have the onus of proving you didn't copy them -- because, you know, you could.
> But feel free to communicate your thoughts to the httpbis ietf workgroup.
> (btw the current http/2 discussions would make an interesting lwn article topic)
Please link them!
One more thing: I asked for (at least one) use-case where https interception would be better than dot1x+radius... :-D