Kieran Clancy claims 6-7 bits of entropy per password character. If the password is vaguely memorable this is ridiculous: applied cryptography quotes various sources claiming that english is ~1 bit per character, with a small range depending on the sort of text involved.
Passwords might be a bit more difficult but 2 bits/character is probably optimistic. If use pronounceable nonsense then there will be patterns like th, po, ou, rarely having 3 or more consecutive vowels, etc.
Maybe Kieran Clancy can remember truly random passwords, which might have 6 bits/character but I, and most of the rest of the world, can't.
Posted Jun 15, 2012 2:36 UTC (Fri) by codebeard (guest, #63144)
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Kieran here. Can't view the main article for it, so this may have already been discussed there.
For what it's worth, most of the passwords I use are truly random. But yes, of course using any weak password is a poor choice.
The applied cryptography sources you mention are probably using the theory published by NIST, which has been shown to be fundamentally flawed for real-world passwords [1]. According to NIST, the first character is worth about 4 bits, the next seven characters around 2 bits and it drops after that. Fortunately, in the real-world things are a bit better (pun intended).