Weekly Edition
Return to the Distributions page
| |||||||||||||||||||
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats
Greetings, patient friends:
The elections for the Fedora Board, Fedora Engineering Steering
Committee (FESCo), and Fedora Ambassadors Steering Committee (FAmSCo)
have concluded, and the results are shown below.
Apparently, we like to keep things interesting around here; the
improbable situation of having a tie for a seat has occurred. Read on
for details!
* * *
FESCo is electing 5 seats this cycle. A total of 236 ballots were
cast, meaning a candidate could accumulate up to 1,888 votes (236 *
8). The results for the FESCo elections are as follows:
# votes | name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1319 | Kevin Fenzi (FAS: kevin, IRC: nirik)
1208 | Bill Nottingham (FAS: notting, IRC: notting)
1028 | Tomáš Mráz (FAS: tmraz, IRC: t8m)
901 | Peter Jones (FAS: pjones, IRC: pjones)
890 | Josh Boyer (FAS: jwboyer, IRC: jwb)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
844 | Stephen Gallagher (FAS: sgallagh, IRC: sgallagh)
474 | John Dulaney (FAS:jdulaney, IRC: j_dulaney)
350 | Keiran Smith (FAS:affix, IRC:affix)
Therefore, Kevin Fenzi, Bill Nottingham, Tomáš Mráz, Peter Jones, and
Josh Boyer are each elected to FESCo for a full two-release term.
* * *
FAmSCo is electing 7 seats this cycle. As this is a special
transitional election for FAmSCo, all seven seats are open for
election. The four candidates receiving the most votes will be seated
for two release cycles and the next three candidates by vote count
will be seated for one release cycle. As those terms expire, future
elections will be held each release to fill the open seats for two
release terms. A total of 207 ballots were cast, meaning a candidate
could accumulate up to 1,863 votes (207 * 9).
# votes | name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1152 | Christoph Wickert (FAS: cwickert, IRC: cwickert)
887 | Jiri Eischmann (FAS: eischmann, IRC: sesivany)
796 | Clint Savage (FAS: herlo, IRC: herlo)
576 | Nick Bebout (FAS: nb, IRC: nb)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
553 | Alejandro Perez (FAS: aeperezt, IRC: aeperezt)
543 | Daniel Bruno (FAS: dbruno, IRC: danielbruno)
512 | Buddhika Chandradeepa Kurera
(FAS: bckurera, IRC: bckurera)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
470 | Truong Anh Tuan (FAS: tuanta, IRC: tuanta)
340 | Arif Tri Waluyo (FAS: arifiauo, IRC: arifiauo)
Therefore, Christoph Wickert, Jiri Eischmann, Clint Savage, and Nick
Bebout are each elected to FAmSCo for a two-release term; Alejandro
Perez, Daniel Bruno, and Buddhika Chandradeepa Kurera are each elected
to FAmSCo for a one-release term.
* * *
The Fedora Board is electing 3 seats this cycle. Atotal of 199 ballots
were cast, meaning a candidate could accumulate up to 796 votes (199 *
4).
# votes | name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
534 | Peter Robinson (FAS: pbrobinson, IRC: pbrobinson)
505 | Eric Christensen (FAS: sparks, IRC: sparks)
358 | Nick Bebout (FAS: nb, IRC: nb)
358 | Robert 'Bob' Jensen (FAS:bjensen, IRC: EvilBob)
Therefore: Peter Robinson and Eric Christensen are elected to the
Board for a full two-release term.
Additionally: Nick Bebout and Robert 'Bob' Jensen have tied for the
remaining seat; a runoff election will be held to determine the
remaining seat, beginning Tuesday, June 12, and ending Tuesday, June
19.
* * *
Congratulations to the winning candidates, and a hearty thank-you to
all nominees for running and participating in this elections cycle.
-Robyn
--
announce mailing list
announce@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/announce
(Log in to post comments)
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats Posted Jun 8, 2012 22:01 UTC (Fri) by dmitrij.ledkov (subscriber, #63320) [Link]
Should have used Condorcet voting.
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats Posted Jun 9, 2012 17:48 UTC (Sat) by scientes (guest, #83068) [Link]
are they just using first-past-the-post?
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats Posted Jun 12, 2012 6:09 UTC (Tue) by michich (subscriber, #17902) [Link] Fedora uses range voting.
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats Posted Jun 9, 2012 17:50 UTC (Sat) by theophrastus (guest, #80847) [Link]
Even simpler than that (or ranked voting) is "approval voting" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting) wherein the voter can vote for as many of the candidates as they wish (voting for everyone just nullifies your vote's effect into the entropy). The winner is the one that gets the most votes. It eliminates the "ralph nader" effect. And it is about as simple as it gets.
Yet there is no perfect voting system. i believe there's mathematical proof of that.
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats Posted Jun 9, 2012 19:08 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
I think Condorcet voting (that Debian uses) has been proven to come closest to the perfect voting system.
Election Results for Fedora Board, FAmSCo, and FESCo seats Posted Jun 10, 2012 4:11 UTC (Sun) by tialaramex (subscriber, #21167) [Link]
Specifically what was proved was that the set of attributes which many people would agree are desirable from a preference-based voting system for a simple election (pick one candidate from a list) cannot all be achieved simultaneously for a single system.
This is called Arrow's impossibility theorem.
You can beat this if you're willing to change the possible criteria. For example, the "one person one vote" criterion might actually be unfair. We can recognise a decision by two wolves and one sheep on what to have for dinner is not made fair by giving each "person" a vote.
Condorcet Posted Jun 10, 2012 3:17 UTC (Sun) by tialaramex (subscriber, #21167) [Link]
Condorcet selects a single candidate from a list. It would in principle work to select the US President, or a British MP but it can't be used in these seat-filling applications.
Notice also that Condorcet's criterion itself does _nothing_ when there's a draw, and draws are common for highly contested elections under Condorcet. You have to add a fix-up on top of Condorcet if you would like to elect somebody rather than tell the electorate "too bad, you did not make a clear choice between these candidates". When using these fix-ups the complete electoral system is no longer "fair" in the specific sense that Condorcet is fair.
Finally, though least problematic considering the electorate in this case, Condorcet is relatively difficult to explain and the fix-up is even harder. For democracy to be effective in its primary role (affording bloodless transitions of power) it must be transparent and a complex voting system is opaque to the average person. This is the unique advantage of FPTP, even young children with no arithmetic ability can understand who wins a FPTP election.
Condorcet Posted Jun 10, 2012 17:00 UTC (Sun) by ballombe (subscriber, #9523) [Link]
> This is the unique advantage of FPTP, even young children with no arithmetic ability can understand who wins a FPTP election.
True, but it has the drawback that they do not understand how they should vote in a FPTP election to maximize their vote influence, due to strategic voting.
Condorcet Posted Jun 11, 2012 13:20 UTC (Mon) by nye (guest, #51576) [Link]
>True, but it has the drawback that they do not understand how they should vote in a FPTP election to maximize their vote influence, due to strategic voting
Right. The rules are simple, but the game is not. Since simply learning the rules is insufficient in order to be able to play, trading off a marginally more complex voting system in exchange for a simpler game is a win for everyone with no vested interest in voter ignorance.
Condorcet Posted Jun 11, 2012 17:30 UTC (Mon) by theophrastus (guest, #80847) [Link]
...or said another way:
a win for everyone with a vested interest in voters with special/superior knowledge (of the underlying voting methodology)
|
|||||||||||||||||||