I imagine the author means algorithms based on... rather than intending that you should use an unpessimised and unsalted hash.
Probably this is because of the same error that Poul-Henning Kamp has made in the last few days here: http://phk.freebsd.dk/sagas/md5crypt_eol.html, giving advice with the assumption that the people receiving it are smart, well-motivated people who know the topic.
A handful of people will muse on what PHK wrote and then write robust, heavily pessimised and salted hashing algorithms, custom for their application, properly review and test them and put them into production. But far more people will take this as an opportunity to either:
(a) continue using crude variants of MD5(password) using e.g. a small per-application salt under the belief that a little obscurity buys them more than the security of an established algorithm such as PHK-MD5 or even the DES crypt.
(b) argue that these crypto programmers don't understand real world problems such as the desire to re-use passwords across applications and thus ought to be ignored by "real" programmers who need to get that PHP web forum working to keep the client happy.
Overall I think PHK's article was mistimed, not least because the numbers he gives to "scare you straight" seem to be exaggerated or based on some additional assumptions he didn't provide.