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Fedora, secure boot, and an insecure futureFedora, secure boot, and an insecure futurePosted Jun 6, 2012 18:46 UTC (Wed) by pjones (guest, #31722)In reply to: Fedora, secure boot, and an insecure future by neilbrown Parent article: Fedora, secure boot, and an insecure future
No, that doesn't follow. If a signed kernel is exploitable, that kernel needs to be prevented from being used (using whatever mechanism). Other things signed by that key may still be trusted, depending on the circumstances.
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Fedora, secure boot, and an insecure future Posted Jun 14, 2012 5:07 UTC (Thu) by kevinm (guest, #69913) [Link]
It doesn't matter if you release an update for the signed bootloader that refuses to boot the known-buggy kernel, because the original signed bootloader that *doesn't* have that update is still out in the wild. Malware that wants to take over Windows machines will simply use the un-updated signed bootloader together with the signed buggy kernel.
Fedora, secure boot, and an insecure future Posted Jun 14, 2012 12:03 UTC (Thu) by mjg59 (subscriber, #23239) [Link]
That's why you're able to revoke binaries at the firmware level.
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