By Jake Edge
May 9, 2012
Internet "censorship" is often associated with repressive governments
filtering the traffic of their citizens, but it goes well beyond that.
Internet service providers sometimes filter—or alter—the
traffic that they carry, companies restrict employees based on keywords and
URLs, courts naïvely order certain URLs to be blocked, and so on. But it
is difficult for any particular internet user to know just what it is they
can't get at. That problem is what the Tor Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
project is hoping to help solve.
The overall goal for the OONI project is "to collect data which shows
an accurate representation of network interference on the Filternet we call
the internet", according to the web site. One obvious, though time
consuming, way to do that is to gather information from multiple different
"locations" on the internet, and that is what OONI has set out to do. Of
course, the OONI project itself can only reach out so far, so the intent is
to enlist other participants—essentially "crowdsourcing" the data
collection.
There are other internet censorship tracking projects—Google's Transparency Report
and Herdict for example—but the OONI
project's
README notes that other efforts either use a closed methodology or closed
software. As befits a Tor
project, though, OONI is fully open source. No top-level LICENSE file for
OONI is
present at
the moment, but one would guess it will be similar to Tor's permissive license.
The core piece (ooni-probe) is written as a framework in Python,
with an eye toward
contributions of additional tests (called "plugoos") and reports. "Tests"
are meant to detect
censorship events by comparing the results obtained locally with some kind
of experimental control. That control could be obtained via the Tor
network, for example, or via some other means. The tests can use various
kinds of "assets", which might include lists of URLs, IP addresses and
ports, or keywords, as their input. Current tests
include checking that Tor bridges are functioning, determining whether HTTP
"Host" field
filtering is occurring, checking for DNS tampering, doing address and port
scans, detecting Squid proxies, and so on.
While there are plenty of tests that could be added, seemingly the area
needing the most attention
right now is the "reports". Currently, test failures are
essentially just written to an unstructured text log file, which can
be stored locally or uploaded to a server. Tools to interpret the data and
to provide higher-level visualizations of the types and locations of
internet censorship are planned.
While the OONI code is under heavy development, the project can
already claim some successes. ooni-probe was used to detect eight
blocked web sites for internet users in Bethlehem, West Bank. The
probe scanned more than one million sites and found that users are blocked
from eight news sites "whose reporting is critical of
[Palestinian Authority] President Mahmoud Abbas".
In addition,
ooni-probe found that T-Mobile USA's Web Guard "feature" blocks
access to much more than the advertised categories. In particular,
sites for Tor, the Internet Archive WaybackMachine, Chinese sports news,
French economics and financial news, a Japanese URL shortener, and many
others, were blocked though they didn't fall into any of the listed categories: "Alcohol,
Mature Content, Violence, Drugs, Pornography, Weapons, Gambling, Suicide,
Guns, Hate, Tobacco, Ammunition".
OONI is just getting started, but it is clearly a welcome addition to the
internet landscape. In order for John Gilmore's famous quote ("The
Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around
it"—which seems to be an informal slogan for OONI) to be
true, the internet, or really its users and operators, must be aware of
where that censorship is occurring and how it is being applied. With tools
like OONI (and the others, though it's unclear why they aren't more
transparent), routing around that censorship will be easier. The free flow
of information on the internet depends on being able to do so.
Comments (none posted)
Brief items
> Is chkrootkit confused?
Yes and no. It correctly detects that your /sbin/init is something hideous
and nasty, but fails to realise that it's something hideous and nasty that
Fedora ships 8)
--
Alan
Cox
If the Order stands, Twitter will be put in the untenable position of
either providing user communications and account information in response to
all subpoenas or attempting to vindicate its users’ rights by moving to
quash these subpoenas itself--even though Twitter will often know little or
nothing about the underlying facts necessary to support their users’
argument that the subpoenas may be improper.
--
Twitter
stands up for its users
As long as the Air Force pinky-swears it didn’t mean to, its drone fleet
can keep tabs on the movements of Americans, far from the battlefields of
Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen. And it can hold data on them for 90 days —
studying it to see if the people it accidentally spied upon are actually
legitimate targets of domestic surveillance.
--
Spencer Ackerman
An Apple programmer, apparently by accident, left a debug flag in the most recent version of the Mac OS X operating system. In specific configurations, applying OS X Lion update 10.7.3 turns on a system-wide debug log file that contains the login passwords of every user who has logged in since the update was applied. The passwords are stored in clear text.
--
Emil Protalinski
Comments (2 posted)
PHP 5.3.12 and
5.4.2 have been released to fix a nasty security hole that was
disclosed somewhat sooner than planned. Essentially, it allows any remote
attacker to pass command-line arguments to the PHP interpreter behind a web
page—but only in the (hopefully rare) setups where PHP is invoked via the
CGI mechanism. "
If you are using Apache mod_cgi to run PHP you may
be vulnerable. To see if you are just add ?-s to the end of any of your
URLs. If you see your source code, you are vulnerable. If your site renders
normally, you are not."
Comments (12 posted)
Bit-tech
reports
that Barnes & Noble pulled the last issue of Linux Format magazine
because of an article featuring hacking techniques.
"
Issue 154 of Linux Format magazine had as its cover feature a piece entitled 'Learn to Hack,' walking readers through the use of the Metasploit Framework exploitation toolkit to gain access to computer systems running a variety of operating systems. The article also covered password cracking, network sniffing, and man-in-the-middle attacks over encrypted protocols.
More importantly, the guide also covered how best to protect your systems
from the self-same attacks, providing readers with information that the
publication hoped would help keep them safe from the ne'er-do-wells
inhabiting the seedier sides of the net." Future, Linux Format's
parent company, has
made the article
available online.
Comments (28 posted)
New vulnerabilities
argyllcms: code execution
| Package(s): | argyllcms |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2012-1616
|
| Created: | May 7, 2012 |
Updated: | June 19, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the Red Hat bugzilla:
A Use-after-free vulnerability was found in the way icclib, a library used for reading and writing of color profile files that conform to the International Color Consortium (ICC) Profile Format Specification, processed certain crafted ICC profile files. The ICC Profile Format is a cross-platform device profile format that can be used to translate color data created on one device into another device's native color space.
A remote attacker could provide a specially crafted file and trick a local user into opening it, which could lead to arbitrary code execution with the
privileges of the user running an application linked against icclib. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (3 posted)
asterisk: denial of service
| Package(s): | asterisk |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2012-2416
|
| Created: | May 4, 2012 |
Updated: | May 9, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the CVE entry:
chan_sip.c in the SIP channel driver in Asterisk Open Source 1.8.x before 1.8.11.1 and 10.x before 10.3.1 and Asterisk Business Edition C.3.x before C.3.7.4, when the trustrpid option is enabled, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) by sending a SIP UPDATE message that triggers a connected-line update attempt without an associated channel. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
flash-player: code execution
| Package(s): | flash-player |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2012-0779
|
| Created: | May 7, 2012 |
Updated: | May 23, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the SUSE advisory:
Adobe Flash Player before 10.3.183.19 and 11.x before 11.2.202.235 on Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux; before 11.1.111.9 on Android 2.x and 3.x; and before 11.1.115.8 on Android 4.x allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file, related to an "object confusion vulnerability," as exploited in the wild in May 2012. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
horizon: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | horizon |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2012-2094
CVE-2012-2144
|
| Created: | May 7, 2012 |
Updated: | May 9, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the
Matthias Weckbecker discovered a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability
in Horizon via the log viewer refrash mechanism. If a user were tricked
into viewing a specially crafted log message, a remote attacker could
exploit this to modify the contents or steal confidential data within the
same domain. (CVE-2012-2094)
Thomas Biege discovered a session fixation vulnerability in Horizon. An
attacker could exploit this to potentially allow access to unauthorized
information and capabilities. (CVE-2012-2144) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel: denial of service
| Package(s): | linux |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2012-2100
|
| Created: | May 8, 2012 |
Updated: | December 19, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the Ubuntu advisory:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ext4 file system when mounting a
corrupt filesystem. A user-assisted remote attacker could exploit this flaw
to cause a denial of service. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mahara: insecure default/privilege escalation
| Package(s): | mahara |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 9, 2012 |
Updated: | May 9, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the Debian advisory:
It was discovered that Mahara, the portfolio, weblog, and resume builder,
had an insecure default with regards to SAML-based authentication used
with more than one SAML identity provider. Someone with control over one
IdP could impersonate users from other IdP's. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mozilla-https-everywhere: no SSL switch for some URLs
| Package(s): | mozilla-https-everywhere |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 3, 2012 |
Updated: | May 9, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the Tor bug entry:
If you go to a URL such as http://www.google.com./ HTTPS-Everywhere will *not* switch to HTTPS. This is a legal DNS value, technically but not practically distinct from http://www.google.com/ and as such, it should be handled similarly.
[...] (it would allow an active attacker to perform Firesheep-style cookie stealing accounts against sites that HTTPS Everywhere protects with domain-wide redirects, if the ruleset does not also have a <securecookie> directive) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openconnect: denial of service
| Package(s): | openconnect |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 7, 2012 |
Updated: | May 9, 2012 |
| Description: |
Version 3.18 of openconnect, a client for Cisco's "AnyConnect" VPN, fixes a potential buffer overrun when handling the greeting banner from the server.
Also this update fixes a potential crash when processing libproxy results. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
php: code execution
| Package(s): | php5 |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2012-2311
CVE-2012-1823
|
| Created: | May 7, 2012 |
Updated: | July 2, 2012 |
| Description: |
From the Ubuntu advisory:
It was discovered that PHP, when used as a stand alone CGI processor
for the Apache Web Server, did not properly parse and filter query
strings. This could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code
running with the privilege of the web server. Configurations using
mod_php5 and FastCGI were not vulnerable. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
python3: multiple vulnerabilities
Comments (none posted)
Page editor: Jake Edge
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