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Remote root hole in SambaRemote root hole in SambaPosted Apr 11, 2012 16:49 UTC (Wed) by drag (subscriber, #31333)In reply to: Remote root hole in Samba by Cyberax Parent article: Remote root hole in Samba
> Programs in OpenBSD chroot have access to all the syscalls.
You'd have to use systrace in conjunction with chroot in OpenBSD to properly sandbox applications. That way you can restrict what type of syscalls can be used.
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Remote root hole in Samba Posted Apr 11, 2012 17:17 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
Systrace (as all other generic syscall wrappers) is vulnerable to concurrent attacks.
Remote root hole in Samba Posted Apr 14, 2012 20:37 UTC (Sat) by andres (guest, #83358) [Link]
Your last two posts in this thread clearly show you have no idea what you're talking about.
systrace is only "vunerable" to TOCTOU/TOATOU if your policy involves checking pointer arguments.
systrace policies such as ssh's block entire syscalls outright; they don't check arguments. As such, those policies are not vulnerable.
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