Nobody should be using /dev/random, not even for generating keys. It basically just uses a bunch of haphazard heuristics to know when it has been "drained" of entropy. These hueristics work about as well as the OOM killer (i.e. they appear to work most of the time but are easily broken, the authors know this, and nobody actually cares because it doesn't really matter given the express tradeoffs.)
Use /dev/urandom because it's going to be _at least_ as strong as /dev/random. Both fundamentally use the same cryptographic primitives for mixing entropy, and that's all that matters. If that's broken, it hardly matters that you've blocked for three seconds waiting for some disk activity. Everybody but Linux has a /dev/random that doesn't block, including OS X, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD.
Linux doesn't use carefully constructed PRNGs like Fortuna or Yarrow--for various reasons, including Linux's epic case of NIHS--but their stubbornness has paid off in the sense that they've goaded researchers into breaking it and it hasn't happened yet. So in that sense, it is quite bulletproof.