Posted Mar 26, 2012 23:56 UTC (Mon) by luto (subscriber, #39314)
[Link]
Because then a task could break out of seccomp mode 2 by running a setuid program. That would IMO rather defeat the purpose.
I suspect that the average system has any number of setuid binaries installed that allow you to run arbitrary code as yourself, since that wouldn't normally be considered a security problem. As a trivial example:
$ sudo -u luto -s
does not prompt for a password.
Cook: seccomp filter now in Ubuntu
Posted Mar 27, 2012 0:14 UTC (Tue) by slashdot (guest, #22014)
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Well, one could indeed use nnp to avoid that, or conversely they could prepare a chroot or FS namespace with no or select setuid programs.
But maybe it's good to require it, to prevent people accidentally introducing security holes because they don't know they either need to use nnp, restrict execve or use a filesystem namespace.
Cook: seccomp filter now in Ubuntu
Posted Mar 27, 2012 0:18 UTC (Tue) by luto (subscriber, #39314)
[Link]
Unprivileged users can't chroot (yet [1]) or use FS namespaces. And correctly detecting when execve(2) will run a setuid program is probably impossible except in very limited circumstances.