Security quotes of the week
[Posted February 22, 2012 by jake]
I used to provide detached GnuPG signatures alongside my uploaded
source tarballs but nobody cared or even noticed if I inadvertently
broke the signature. (This is for packages which regularly got
downloaded for inclusion into Fedora, ArchLinux, Gentoo and numerous
other distros other than Debian/Debian-based ones which get the source
directly from me.)
Honestly, nobody cares.
--
Neil Williams
ICANN has plowed ahead with their extortive get-rich-quick gTLD
expansion scheme. The U.S. has turned the DNS into a mechanism for
unilaterial actions over entities in other countries, without such
[niceties] as due process being required. The list goes on and on.
So no wonder the rest of the world pushes for changes -- and threatens
network fragemention -- even as their proposed regulatory regimes could
do enormous damage to the Net.
--
Lauren Weinstein
This book marks another chapter in my career’s endless series of
generalizations. From mathematical security — cryptography — to computer
and network security; from there to security technology in general; then to
the economics of security and the psychology of security; and now to — I
suppose — the sociology of security. The more I try to understand how
security works, the more of the world I need to encompass within my model.
--
Bruce
Schneier on his new book
Liars and Outliers
While everyone else was focused on the normal patch specific
vuln/update/forget cycle, our focus with these high-profile vulnerabilities
has always been to look at tangential issues that are unlikely to be
resolved upstream: exploitation techniques that either made certain
strategies easier or possible in the first place. In the case of
CVE-2012-0056, that issue revealed itself during a discussion on the
full-disclosure mailing list on how to reliably exploit systems that
changed the permission of the suid root binaries to deny reading. While
such a permission change prevented the use of objdump in initial exploits,
it was mentioned that a ptrace followed by an exec of the suid root binary
allows one to effectively read the contents of the mapped binary. This
might be surprising, as a ptrace of an existing suid root process would be
denied. When execing a privileged binary while ptracing though, the binary
is run without the extra privileges. When the goal is reading out the
binary, however, this is irrelevant.
--
Brad
Spengler on "How We Learn From Exploits"
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