It seems to me that inventing a new browser-specific mechanism for pushing revocation lists to Chrome is a bad plan. Rather, the CRL mechanism could be adapted in a way that would serve all browsers.
At a quick glance it looks like all that is needed is (a) to ignore the TTL of the revocations in the CRL and instead use the TTL of the cert being revoked (why is this not the default?), and (b) to offer a way to request CRLs in blocks by date so that browsers need only pull revocations that they may not have seen yet. This combination of features would serve the same purpose as the Chrome "browser update": browsers could refresh their cache of revoked certs whenever feasible, without delaying in-flight https requests or exposing the users' browsing information.
Given the modest nature of the proposed changes, it doesn't seem so hard to get all actively-developed browsers to play along. It would be nice to have a standardized mechanism, and it seems like it might even be less work for Google.