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28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H)28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H)Posted Jan 3, 2012 12:18 UTC (Tue) by erwbgy (subscriber, #4104)In reply to: 28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H) by josh Parent article: 28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H)
Depending on how A5/3 is implemented it may still have security issues. From Wikipedia: In 2010, Dunkleman, Keller and Shamir published a new attack that allows to recover a full A5/3 key by related-key attack.[5] The time and space complexities of the attack are low enough that the authors carried out the attack in two hours on a modest desktop computer even using the unoptimized reference KASUMI implementation. The authors note that this attack may not be applicable to the way A5/3 is used in 3G systems; their main purpose was to discredit 3GPP's assurances that their changes to MISTY wouldn't significantly impact the security of the algorithm.
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