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28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H)28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H)Posted Dec 29, 2011 19:40 UTC (Thu) by josh (subscriber, #17465)Parent article: 28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H)
Quoting the article: "Almost all modern mobiles are able to use A5/3. According to Nohl, the failure by a single vendor despite its claims to the contrary to implement the updated algorithm is currently preventing mobile operators from carrying out trials."
Anyone know which vendor? The article failed to include that detail.
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28C3: New attacks on GSM mobiles and security measures shown (The H) Posted Jan 3, 2012 12:18 UTC (Tue) by erwbgy (subscriber, #4104) [Link] Depending on how A5/3 is implemented it may still have security issues. From Wikipedia: In 2010, Dunkleman, Keller and Shamir published a new attack that allows to recover a full A5/3 key by related-key attack.[5] The time and space complexities of the attack are low enough that the authors carried out the attack in two hours on a modest desktop computer even using the unoptimized reference KASUMI implementation. The authors note that this attack may not be applicable to the way A5/3 is used in 3G systems; their main purpose was to discredit 3GPP's assurances that their changes to MISTY wouldn't significantly impact the security of the algorithm.
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