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The Journal - a proposed syslog replacementThe Journal - a proposed syslog replacementPosted Nov 19, 2011 5:39 UTC (Sat) by jcm (subscriber, #18262)Parent article: The Journal - a proposed syslog replacement
Just to comment on the specific quote in the original post. There is absolutely no reason syslog entries we have today could not include a cryptographic hash. Therefore, calling that out as a "feature" needs to be countered promptly less some become confused that only by replacing another fundamental piece of Unix technology can we be "secure" from kernel.org breakins in the future.
As to the notion of a binary only, undocumented, non-standardized logging format...I don't know where to begin so in the interest of my blood pressure, I won't comment further on that.
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The Journal - a proposed syslog replacement Posted Nov 19, 2011 17:28 UTC (Sat) by jcm (subscriber, #18262) [Link]
Secondarily, the only way to do secure logging properly is to send logs to another machine, preferably at some point involving physical hard copy. I see all of these reactionary claims post the kernel.org break-in, some boarding on total nonsense (like the systems now configured to blow away any ssh keys found stored therein - hint, there are many other things someone could do to compromise global security, this is caring way too much about one thing). But anyway, to get back to the point, the *only* *ONLY* way to do security when it comes to logging is airgap separated external one-way logging to another machine. ONLY.
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