Fraudulent *.google.com certificate issued
Posted Aug 30, 2011 19:03 UTC (Tue) by dkg
In reply to: Fraudulent *.google.com certificate issued
Parent article: Fraudulent *.google.com certificate issued
Or, a powerful adversary could just lean on one of the parties holding a key that sits "above" the target domain, and request that the keyholder quietly provide a properly-signed RR that delegates a sub-zone to the adversary.
Then, the adversary serves this RR in response to the victim's DNS request, and manages the sub-zone themselves. With such an RR in hand, the adversary only needs to control the victim's upstream network connection in order to be able to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of their communications.
if the delegated zone is a high-level one (e.g. .com), then something like phreebird in front of a filtering DNS cache should be fine (filtering to replace the authoritative keys for the sub-zones with its own key, that is). It would take a bit of engineering, but it's far from an insurmountable task.
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