|From the Debian advisory:
CVE-2011-1402: It was discovered that previous versions of Mahara did not check user credentials before adding a secret URL to a view or suspending a user.
CVE-2011-1403: Due to a misconfiguration of the Pieform package in Mahara, the cross-site request forgery protection mechanism that Mahara relies on to harden its form was not working and was essentially disabled. This is a critical vulnerability which could allow attackers to trick other users (for example administrators) into performing malicious actions on behalf of the attacker. Most Mahara forms are vulnerable.
CVE-2011-1404: Many of the JSON structures returned by Mahara for its AJAX interactions included more information than what ought to be disclosed to the logged in user. New versions of Mahara limit this information to what is necessary for each page.
CVE-2011-1405: Previous versions of Mahara did not escape the contents of HTML emails sent to users. Depending on the filters enabled in one's mail reader, it could lead to cross-site scripting attacks.
CVE-2011-1406: It has been pointed out to us that if Mahara is configured (through its wwwroot variable) to use HTTPS, it will happily let users login via the HTTP version of the site if the web server is configured to serve content over both protocol. The new version of Mahara will, when the wwwroot points to an HTTPS URL, automatically redirect to HTTPS if it detects that it is being run over HTTP.