| From the Red Hat bugzilla:
At two points in handling device ioctls via /dev/mpt2ctl, user-supplied length values are used to copy data from userspace into heap buffers without bounds checking, allowing controllable heap corruption and subsequently privilege escalation. (CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495)
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack. (CVE-2011-1079)
pg_start is copied from userspace on AGPIOC_BIND and AGPIOC_UNBIND ioctl
cmds of agp_ioctl() and passed to agpioc_bind_wrap(). As said in the
comment, (pg_start + mem->page_count) may wrap in case of AGPIOC_BIND,
and it is not checked at all in case of AGPIOC_UNBIND. As a result, user
with sufficient privileges (usually "video" group) may generate either
local DoS or privilege escalation. (CVE-2011-1745)
page_count is copied from userspace. agp_allocate_memory() tries to
check whether this number is too big, but doesn't take into account the
wrap case. Also agp_create_user_memory() doesn't check whether
alloc_size is calculated from num_agp_pages variable without overflow.
This may lead to allocation of too small buffer with following buffer
overflow. (CVE-2011-1746)
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