This might be possible to do without having a huge wallet. The IP assets of your typical run-of-the-mill IT company are almost worthless. Larger companies don't buy moribund software companies for their software or patents, but usually for their employees. So an IT company that no longer has any employees is almost completely worthless, with no hope of paying off creditors.
And if we target a company whose primary business wasn't even software, but where software was merely collateral to their primary "business innovation", then it should be even easier to acquire, and more effective an example. Then we're showing that you can't do *anything* without paying these exorbitant fees.
One problem with this approach, though, is that it presumes the law expects compliance. To the contrary, most legal scholars would readily admit that as regards patent and copyright, most behavior is "unlawful". This doesn't just apply to patent and copyright. We commit torts all the time. Imagine how expensive it would be to ensure that we never illegally trespassed, or never committed a battery? It's implicit that we all make cost+benefit analyses regarding our behavior. This is ultimately the difference between civil and criminal law. It's not inherently wrong to "illegally" use a patent, or to break copyright law. But *if* you get caught, the law allows a transfer of assets. So you modulate your activity based on your expected risk of getting caught, and the law doesn't frown on this balancing act.
The only question then isn't whether you're forced to break the law. The question is whether the transactional costs--e.g. erroneous discounting of your liability (i.e. poor calculation of `damages x chance of getting caught')--are so enormous that the cost is unjustified. This is the case with the property regime in much of Latin America and elsewhere, according to de Soto. (IIRC The Mystery of Capital correctly.)
It's not clear this is the case with software patents. Or rather, given the presumed [if erroneous] benefits that policy makers believe software patents create it's not clear that the transactional costs are disproportional. Arguing that most businesses ignore software patents undercuts our argument. And even if we show high costs then the easiest solution, practically speaking, would be to make enforcement for software patents more difficult and not necessarily to make software patents more difficult to acquire, or scrapping them altogether.
So ultimately we're still left with showing that the absolute benefits created by software patents are illusory.