Qubes beta 1 released

not exactly. it tells you what was running at the time SENTER executed, it says nothing about the future. in a post somewhere above you tried to dismiss the problem of exploitable bugs by saying this:

> Some OS partition will be where that wireless driver exists. So when
> someone exploits that flaw and roots that OS partition then the
> hypervisor should be able to tell (new executable pages come in to
> existence or the contents of executable pages change). So it has done
> its job and let you know that said partition is rooted.

so this hypervisor wouldn't let guest kernels modify themselves (think of the alternatives mechanism in linux) or load kernel modules? can you name a single widespread (or heck, any) distro which would be able to run on this hypervisor? so you can't do this. but then runtime code generation must be allowed for the guest kernels and that means any kernel exploit is back in business, TXT/hypervisor/etc didn't improve anything, you still don't know what code runs on your box.