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Re: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400

From:  Pekka Enberg <penberg-AT-kernel.org>
To:  Matt Mackall <mpm-AT-selenic.com>
Subject:  Re: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400
Date:  Fri, 4 Mar 2011 22:02:51 +0200
Message-ID:  <AANLkTimRN_=APe_PWMFe_6CHHC7psUbCYE-O0qc=mmYY@mail.gmail.com>
Cc:  Linus Torvalds <torvalds-AT-linux-foundation.org>, Dave Hansen <dave-AT-linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso-AT-mit.edu>, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg-AT-vsecurity.com>, cl-AT-linux-foundation.org, linux-mm-AT-kvack.org, linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo-AT-elte.hu>, Andrew Morton <akpm-AT-linux-foundation.org>
Archive-link:  Article, Thread

On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 8:14 PM, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> wrote:
>> Of course, as you say, '/proc/meminfo' still does give you the trigger
>> for "oh, now somebody actually allocated a new page". That's totally
>> independent of slabinfo, though (and knowing the number of active
>> slabs would neither help nor hurt somebody who uses meminfo - you
>> might as well allocate new sockets in a loop, and use _only_ meminfo
>> to see when that allocated a new page).
>
> I think lying to the user is much worse than changing the permissions.
> The cost of the resulting confusion is WAY higher.

Yeah, maybe. I've attached a proof of concept patch that attempts to
randomize object layout in individual slabs. I'm don't completely
understand the attack vector so I don't make any claims if the patch
helps or not.

                        Pekka
From cd1e20fb8eb44627fa5ccebc8a2803c1fd7bf7ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2011 21:28:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] SLUB: Randomize object layout in slabs

Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
---
 mm/slub.c |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index e15aa7f..1837fe3 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/memory.h>
 #include <linux/math64.h>
 #include <linux/fault-inject.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/kmem.h>
 
@@ -1183,6 +1184,46 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 		s->ctor(object);
 }
 
+static bool setup_slab_randomized(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned long bitmap[8];
+	size_t bitmap_size;
+	void *last, *start;
+
+	bitmap_size = BITS_TO_LONGS(page->objects) * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(bitmap) * sizeof(unsigned long) < bitmap_size)
+		return false;
+
+	bitmap_fill(bitmap, page->objects);
+
+	start = page_address(page);
+
+	last = start;
+	while (!bitmap_empty(bitmap, page->objects)) {
+		unsigned long idx;
+		void *p;
+
+		idx	= get_random_int() % page->objects;
+
+		idx	= find_next_bit(bitmap, page->objects, idx);
+
+		if (idx >= page->objects)
+			continue;
+
+		clear_bit(idx, bitmap);
+
+		p = start + idx * s->size;
+		setup_object(s, page, last);
+		set_freepointer(s, last, p);
+		last = p;
+	}
+	setup_object(s, page, last);
+	set_freepointer(s, last, NULL);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 {
 	struct page *page;
@@ -1206,6 +1247,9 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_POISON))
 		memset(start, POISON_INUSE, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
 
+	if (setup_slab_randomized(s, page, flags))
+		goto done; 
+
 	last = start;
 	for_each_object(p, s, start, page->objects) {
 		setup_object(s, page, last);
@@ -1215,6 +1259,7 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	setup_object(s, page, last);
 	set_freepointer(s, last, NULL);
 
+done:
 	page->freelist = start;
 	page->inuse = 0;
 out:
-- 
1.7.0.4


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