|| ||Mark J Cox <mjc-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA-AT-public.gmane.org> |
|| ||OSS Security List <oss-security-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8-AT-public.gmane.org> |
|| ||Re: Vendor-sec hosting and future of closed lists |
|| ||Thu, 3 Mar 2011 18:31:08 +0000 (GMT)|
|| ||Article, Thread
> Also the usefulness of v-s in general has a bit diminished, especially with
> oss-sec present and more active and more involved upstream projects doing
> their own management. Mark J Cox has some stats for Redhat updates showing this.
We monitor how we first found out about every issue we eventually fix, and
if we found out before or after the issue was public.
For vendor-sec, during last calendar years
date # issues in advance # issues already public
2008 69 32
2009 57 17
2010 29 22
That 29 represents just 4% of the total number of our vulnerabilities
fixed in 2010. The median time of embargo for those 29 issues was 15 days
But I think that trend is what was expected, as upstream projects
communicate with affected vendors directly, and we use oss-security for
issues that don't need embargo or co-ordination.
Mark J Cox / Red Hat Security Response
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