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PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian)
The Guardian looks
at the implications of the recent PS3 hack. "Like many members of the hacker community, Fail0verflow is resolutely anti-piracy — its members bypass console security systems merely as an intellectual challenge, or to run their own operating systems and applications. Consequently, the group didn't itself reveal the key. However, days later hacker, George Hotz (also known as Geohot), previously responsible for opening the iPhone system to so-called "jailbreak" hacks, did released the required firmware package decrypter on his website. Although the current hack requires users to modify their PS3 to run homebrew apps (or use a PS3 'Jailbreak' dongle, which bypasses the security system on machines with older versions of the firmware), further developments may ensure that anyone with the relevant software tools and technical knowledge could produce applications that will run on any PS3. It would then effectively be an open system. And naturally, the floodgates that have prevented widescale piracy on the console for the last few years could be smashed to pieces."
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PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 21:38 UTC (Fri) by flewellyn (subscriber, #5047) [Link]
No, no, and once again, no. Illegal software copying is not, and cannot be, prevented by binary signing, virtual machines, or any other kind of DRM. It's trivially easy to just take the DVDROM with the legitimately signed software on it, run it through a machine with a DVDRW, and make a bit-for-bit copy. That copy will then run just fine, since it's legitimately signed and everything.
DRM is only about controlling who gets to make software for the machine.
(I know, LWN is the choir, but I still think this bears repeating.)
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 21:50 UTC (Fri) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>It's trivially easy to just take the DVDROM with the legitimately signed software on it, run it through a machine with a DVDRW, and make a bit-for-bit copy. That copy will then run just fine, since it's legitimately signed and everything.
Unfortunately, that's not true. DVD-ROM drive senses media type and won't accept signed binaries from DVD-R or DVD-RW. So you're out of luck unless you have access to CD printing machine.
Besides, PS3's security was actually pretty good. The recent hack is possible only because Sony was not careful enough to use random one-time keys. You can bet that they'll be more careful in future.
PS: I'm actually a bit curious why most of DRM schemes are implemented so poorly. Simple PKI infrastructure (which by now is nothing special) implemented correctly will result in excellent information security.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 21:54 UTC (Fri) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
I have yet to see a PKI infrastructure actually "implemented correctly"
as for the DVDRW drives preventing this, you've missed out on some of the recent hacks.
they've discovered that these drives check the media type when the disk is inserted into the drive, so if you insert a disk that you are allowed to copy, then remove the top of the drive and replace the disk with one that you "aren't" allowed to copy, the drive will then happily read the disk to the system (where it can then be copied)
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 23:49 UTC (Fri) by tcwan (guest, #42830) [Link]
Hmm, shouldn't this information be prefixed with BOLD RED LETTERS that one shouldn't try this at home without laser safety glasses or something?
(No I haven't tried it, but I'd expect that the laser diode would be enabled once the disc has been inserted)
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 0:15 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
the devices already have warning labels on them about the danger of the lasers and how they shouldn't be opened at all because of this.
If this isn't enough for people, adding a warning to info like I posted won't make much difference.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 10, 2011 0:54 UTC (Mon) by jamesh (guest, #1159) [Link]
I don't think he was suggesting that the DVD-RW drive would prevent you from making a copy. Instead he was saying that the system implementing the DRM check could check the media type and refuse to run the software from writeable media.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 22:45 UTC (Fri) by rahvin (subscriber, #16953) [Link]
Even PKI wouldn't work correctly because no matter the system you propose if the user has access to the content they have access to the keys to decode it. You simply can't secure something which you have to provide access to. The problem with DRM and why it will never work is precisely because the point is to let authorized users use the content the users have to have access to all the keys to access the content. How they try to prevent unauthorized access is to obfuscate the location and access to the decoding keys. Anyone determined enough can gain access to those keys and decode the system. Even Blu-Ray and HDVD hardware used PKI and encoded the private keys in hardware and people still gained access to they private key of dozens of hardware devices. They even reverse engineered the Private key for HDCP.
The only encryption that would effectively prevent piracy would also prevent any access. Maybe if someday everything including the decoding equipment is stored in the cloud you might be able to do something, but at that point it's trivial to make sure the user is authorized and DRM would be pointless. It's simply not possible to give every part of the encryption tool chain to the user and expect security, the best you can hope for is making it so difficult few people do it but that usually results in a terrible customer experience and automated tools anyway. DRM is simply a pointless battle that lots of media companies are spending a lot of money on for no real benefit.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 23:45 UTC (Fri) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
even if you put the decrypting stuff in the cloud, unless you also manage to put the users eyeballs in the cloud as well you still have to deliver things to the user, and if you have to do that the data can be captured.
That's why DRM for movies will never work, but DRM for games might Posted Jan 8, 2011 10:28 UTC (Sat) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] With movies all eyeballs are supposed to see the same picture so your argument is valid. With games the whole point is to show different pictures for different eyeballs so cloud-based DRM makes sense. The problem today is that DRM's like implemented by Ubisoft generate all the difference locally and only use cloud to validate user - it'll never work for reasons outlined by others. You actually must move parts of game engine in cloud - and I think it'll happen soon. After that DRM for games will both become totally pointless and will work perfectly - depending on your POV...
That's why DRM for movies will never work, but DRM for games might Posted Jan 8, 2011 19:51 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
that's not a DRM issue, that's a game design issue.
DRM tries to prevent people from copying the game, secondarily they may try to prevent modification of the game using many of the same tools, but that is really a different problem and task than what is normally called DRM
That's why DRM for movies will never work, but DRM for games might Posted Jan 8, 2011 21:44 UTC (Sat) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] DRM tries to prevent people from copying the game Yup - and the perfect solution it to move part of the game to cloud where it can not be easily altered/copied. Think Final Fantasy XI: you can easily copy client and/or install single copy on 10 different systems, but since significant part of logic is on-server you can not play it without paying subscription fee. And DRM for games is supposed to be about money, right?
That's why DRM for movies will never work, but DRM for games might Posted Jan 8, 2011 22:38 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
just because the purpose of DRM is to make money it doesn't mean that every approach that guarantees that you make money is DRM.
games with server-side logic (that are unplayable without connecting to the central server) have been around as long as there have been computer games (in the some of the earliest cases, you needed a terminal connection to the mainframe), that doesn't make this DRM, and it can be done without using any of the tools of DRM (encryption, legal exclusion, etc)
Any game that wants to prevent cheating reliably must keep data and logic on the server side, all attempts to give information to the client, and then have the client not show it to the user are doomed to failure (for all the reasons others have listed)
teminology is important, just like it's a very bad idea to redefine 'rape' to mean "I changed my mind afterwords" or "I was drunk and my judgement was impaired, I never would have done that if I was sober" because it dilutes the meaning of the term, DRM should only be used where it really applies, and not confuse people by using it for other things.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 11:53 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
It would. No TPM device was ever broken so far (in the sense that hackers were able to extract its private key), so we know PKI works just fine. And even the hacks which work around TPMs are quite complicated and mostly stem from carelessness of system designers who just add TPM chips without any considerations for the whole system security.
Yes, it's not possible to securely keep decryption keys in software. But it's certainly possible to do it in hardware.
Sony actually did almost fine - private keys are confined and never leave secure hardware. So there would be no way to get them if not for their improper use.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 13:53 UTC (Sat) by PaXTeam (subscriber, #24616) [Link] > No TPM device was ever broken so far (in the sense that hackers were > able to extract its private key), so we know PKI works just fine. actually, i wouldn't be so sure after having watched Chris Tarnovsky ;).
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 14:24 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
I'm working quite a lot with hardware people and they say that unless TPM designers were really really careless, it's basically impossible to extract secret keys from it. Besides, even if you do extract secret key from one TPM you don't gain that much - you'll only be able to run unsigned software on that machine.
So far, the most sophisticated attack on TPM achieved impersonation of trusted system. And it required nitric acid and very precise soldering: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c_i... And if you integrate TPM into your CPU (like Intel did), this attack will also be impossible.
PS: we're actually using TPMs for good purposes - to safeguard medical data from physical device theft.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 19:47 UTC (Sat) by rahvin (subscriber, #16953) [Link]
HD-DVD and Blu-Ray use essentially TPM. The keys are embedded directly in the hardware. Dozens of keys have been extracted because no matter what you do the key has to be used and in that use the key can be snagged. Others have demonstrated that extracting the TPM key might not be simple but all it takes is one key extracted (even if they can revoke the key) to open up every single disc printed before the revocation.
DRM can't work.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 19:59 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>HD-DVD and Blu-Ray use essentially TPM. The keys are embedded directly in the hardware. Dozens of keys have been extracted because no matter what you do the key has to be used and in that use the key can be snagged.
1) HD-DVD/BluRay security was designed in early 2000-s without much forethought. Next security systems will be way tougher.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 2:24 UTC (Sun) by drag (subscriber, #31333) [Link]
> 1) HD-DVD/BluRay security was designed in early 2000-s without much forethought. Next security systems will be way tougher.
They put a huge amount of effort into it and did what they could to try to future proof it. What you said would be true for DVD-css, but not for AACS or BD+.
> 2) It still requires quite a bit of work to extract keys.
It only needs to be done once.
> 3) And what are you going to do if your media player refuses to play hacked media?
Laugh at it because the company that made it committed commercial suicide. Who is going to buy a device is that not able to play home made videos, cdroms, or their mp3 collection?
Like I said before:
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c_i...
> The Trusted Computing Group, which sets standards on TPM chips, called the attack "exceedingly difficult to replicate in a real-world environment." It added that the group has "never claimed that a physical attack - given enough time, specialised equipment, know-how and money - was impossible. No form of security can ever be held to that standard."
"No form of security can ever be held to that standard".... From the horse's mouth. But that is exactly the standard that needs to be implemented to make strong DRM possible.
Even if it does end up requiring a tunneling electron microscope, then that is what will end up being used. From a commercial standpoint dropping 25-40 grand on one for the purposes of reverse engineering is not a significant expense. It's not like these things are rare :)
Although I expect that plenty of other techniques will get used to pirate media before it gets to that point..... Like purchasing a laptop with TPM and 1080p display and pull the video signals off of the LVDS connection from the graphics card.
Get rid of the government law and the whole DRM scam will blow away like a house of cards in a hurricane. As long as you have governmental controls then even weak DRM will be perfectly effective for what it is designed to do. There is nothing that anybody can do about it as long as your dealing with the conspiracy between government and industry cartels. At least not in the foreseeable future.
The upside is that DRM provides zero benefit except for these government-protected industrial cartels and trusts. It will continue to be a irritating bullshit thing we have to deal with and work around, but it's not going to kill off 'free software' or anything like that.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 13, 2011 6:58 UTC (Thu) by Da_Blitz (guest, #50583) [Link]
I consider TPMs broken at the moment, emulation of a TPM device via the trousers tpm stack and mixing this with QEMU or Xen (the later of which has TPM emulation/visualization) should allow for easy extraction of keys
the other nice thing is since the TPM handles the actual decryption (to prevent revealing the keys) the program feeds you a nice encrypted stream and expects the unencrypted stream back. letting the program that feeds your app deal with all the extra "packaging" that may be added to the encrypted stream for obfuscation while you shuffle these packets to disk to do with what you want
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 13, 2011 7:57 UTC (Thu) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
Uhm. Nope.
1) You won't extract the root key from the device, no matter what you do.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 13, 2011 8:26 UTC (Thu) by Da_Blitz (guest, #50583) [Link]
i agree with that after installing the OS and having the OS generate its keys, but what if the OS was never installed on real hardware but only in a virtual machine, never having any contact with a real TPM
from a piracy point of view TPMs are great, all the keys in the one location. just set up an environment that has never been on real hardware, pull the keys and decode data.
once the DRM industry catches on it becomes an arms race between the priates and the DRM company to detect the latest VM implementations signatures but then again when has it ever not been an arms race when it comes to piracy.
TPMs ask you to trust the TPM implementation, what happens when you cant trust it
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 13, 2011 8:39 UTC (Thu) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>i agree with that after installing the OS and having the OS generate its keys, but what if the OS was never installed on real hardware but only in a virtual machine, never having any contact with a real TPM
OS would immediately notice this - your emulated TPM won't have a valid certificate. Forwarding requests to a real TPM, still won't help you, because OS will detect that. Of course, if encryption keys ever touch the guest OS, you can cacth them - no need to emulate TPM.
But that's not the point here. PS3 essentially has a TPM device with pre-loaded keys which are essential for its operation.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 3:11 UTC (Sat) by drag (subscriber, #31333) [Link]
> PS: I'm actually a bit curious why most of DRM schemes are implemented so poorly. Simple PKI infrastructure (which by now is nothing special) implemented correctly will result in excellent information security.
Because there is no point. Technologically enforced DRM is a fundamentally flawed application of cryptography. Math and reality is against it working no matter how many billions of dollars you'd care to dump into making it possible.
As you know encryption is very strong. AES 128 or 256 on it's own is going to be strong enough to default almost any attacker. Certainly strong enough to protect something as stupid as a movie from copying.
The problem you run into is that in order for the customer to view the media they need to have the ability to decrypt the media.
They need the software to decrypt it, hardware to decrypt it, and keys to decrypt it... otherwise they are not going to be able to watch it. So for DRM to work you not only are handing out encrypted media to your potential attackers, but your also handing out all the software and hardware necessary to decrypt your media to your attackers.
Then to 'crack' the DRM all a attacker needs to do is figure out how the hardware and software works and how the decryption keys are extracted from the information provided to them.
This is why open source is fundamentally incompatible with technologically encforced DRM. If you know how the DRM works then it ruins the illusion that it can protect your media from your own customers.
That is why in order for DRM to work they have laws like the DMCA.
If your goal is to try to make unreality reality then government is your best bet. If people don't play along with your delusions then the government can send armed men to their house to take everything they own, destroy their careers, take them away from everybody they love and throw them into a concrete cage surrounded by angry armed morons.
If all you wanted to do was protect your media from non-paying customers then all you want to do is just implement something like RTP:// with SSL/TLS, or just PGP signed files with a symmetrical encryption scheme. It's dead simple and either as effective or more effective then any DRM scheme out there on the market. The downside is that you have to trust your customers.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 12:47 UTC (Sat) by lab (subscriber, #51153) [Link] Well said!
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 15:43 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>They need the software to decrypt it, hardware to decrypt it, and keys to decrypt it... otherwise they are not going to be able to watch it. So for DRM to work you not only are handing out encrypted media to your potential attackers, but your also handing out all the software and hardware necessary to decrypt your media to your attackers.
But would it help you if your hardware:
That's basically what PS3 does. And the fact that it can be broken is just a result of carelessness of Sony's engineers.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 16:47 UTC (Sat) by drag (subscriber, #31333) [Link]
Everything you need is still there. It's just carefully hidden.
> 3) Never ever exposes keys and PKI certificates to software.
The hardware is still there and under attacker's control. Hardware hacking and reverse engineering requires a different skill set then software hacking does, but it's doable.
I've see hacks were people will pull flash chips out of HD-DVD drives, hack the firmware, then solder them back on. All it takes is for one leaked copy or one hacked drive and then all the world can have as many copies as they feel like. Such is the nature of digital media.
The DRM stuff is much less about preventing piracy and more about controlling markets anyways. By the use of DRM Sony is able to extract licensing fees and control the ecosystem surrounding the PS3 to maximize their own profits. It does not matter if somebody hacks it because the DMCA and the police state protects Sony's 'protections'.
It does not really matter much if the DRM is hacked as the real target is not piracy. The real target is other corporations.
If it was not for the DMCA I wouldn't care about DRM at all, in fact. It would be a fairly big industry here in the USA (and world wide) for providing third party hardware and unlicensed software for doing anything you want to these systems. Ps3 clones, PS3 emulation cards for your PC, games being produced that don't pay Sony's licensing fees, etc etc.
How much would you pay for hardware that is capable of playing any 360 game, any Wii game, or any PS3 game you'd like?
That is what the DRM is aimed at.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 16:59 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>The hardware is still there and under attacker's control. Hardware hacking and reverse engineering requires a different skill set then software hacking does, but it's doable.
Not really. Integrated circuits are not "reverse-engineerable" now, especially when you need an electron microscope just to see individual elements. Even if you have a gate list for an IP-core (analog of a binary-only module) reverse-engineering is close to impossible for anything non-trivial.
>I've see hacks were people will pull flash chips out of HD-DVD drives, hack the firmware, then solder them back on. All it takes is for one leaked copy or one hacked drive and then all the world can have as many copies as they feel like. Such is the nature of digital media.
And what if your firmware is built right into the CPU (as in the case with Intel Sandybridge)? What are you going to do with it?
Anyway, there probably will always be hackable DVD drives. But that's not the point - what are you going to do if your home TV won't play anything that is not encrypted and can't be hacked? And if you are thinking that people won't buy this stuff - look at iCrap and think twice.
Yeah, probably hackers will still be able to get devices that can work around the DRM. But when 99% of your population don't care about freedom it'll be way too easy to outlaw the remaining 1%.
That's why I'm scared about DRM, because it's going to work unless it's stopped. It won't happen overnight, but it will happen.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 17:40 UTC (Sat) by drag (subscriber, #31333) [Link]
> Not really. Integrated circuits are not "reverse-engineerable" now, especially when you need an electron microscope just to see individual elements. Even if you have a gate list for an IP-core (analog of a binary-only module) reverse-engineering is close to impossible for anything non-trivial.
So what? Nobody is going to implement a PKI in pure hardware. And you still have to get the signals in and out of the thing. Just pull the chip out of a device and put it in your own board if you want.
I think your _very_ underestimating the scope of the problem here.
> Yeah, probably hackers will still be able to get devices that can work around the DRM. But when 99% of your population don't care about freedom it'll be way too easy to outlaw the remaining 1%.
That's the way things are now.
It's already illegal.
In addition we have mister President Obama working his tail off to implement requirements that will outlaw the ability to use secure communications over the internet for the expressed purpose of expanding warrentless wiretapping and nobody is blinking a eye on the issue.
> That's why I'm scared about DRM, because it's going to work unless it's stopped. It won't happen overnight, but it will happen.
Don't worry about it much. DRM is already effectively dead.
Look at Blueray. It's DRM design was a international effort and a conspiracy between multiple large corporations and governments. Millions and millions of dollars poured into it's research, design and manufacturer.
Fully 'secured' data path IN the hardware. HCCP. All that crap. The cost to the industry and to consumers for the extra hardware overhead and infrastructure needed to create and maintain blueray DRM probably ranges close to the billions.
It has the ability to revoke keys on the fly. To disable hardware and software that has known vulnerabilities remotely.
How long did it last?
DRM will linger on for another decade or two due to government protections, the level of self-delusion that these people operate under, and the fact that it has relatively little to do with piracy, but everything to do with controlling markets against competition.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 17:49 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>So what? Nobody is going to implement a PKI in pure hardware.
PKI is _already_ implemented in hardware. That's that TPM chips are. And yes, they really do encryption, decryption, signing and signature validation completely in hardware.
>And you still have to get the signals in and out of the thing. Just pull the chip out of a device and put it in your own board if you want.
How would you pull TPM module integrated into your CPU (see: Intel Insider)?
>That's the way things are now.
>Fully 'secured' data path IN the hardware. HCCP. All that crap. The cost to the industry and to consumers for the extra hardware overhead and infrastructure needed to create and maintain blueray DRM probably ranges close to the billions.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 18:13 UTC (Sat) by drag (subscriber, #31333) [Link]
> How would you pull TPM module integrated into your CPU (see: Intel Insider)?
I donno. I usually use motherboards to house my CPU. :)
> But it's easy technically. So it's widespreaded. But if you make piracy technically complicated you'll immediately make it easier to go after hackers.
I think you'd have a hard time making more complicated then AACS or BD+. This was a very significant effort.
> And yet DRM has won. It has attacked from an unexpected direction - mobile devices.
Hardly. Mobile devices are proprietary and closed from day one. It's only recently that it's starting to open up.
Please tell the story... Posted Jan 8, 2011 18:56 UTC (Sat) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] And yet DRM has won. It has attacked from an unexpected direction - mobile devices. Do tell. It should be interested story because as I'm seeing it DRM was employed by mobile for years and never worked without government enfocement. Mobiles were sold "locked" for years in US, Japan and other countries. They employed crude form of DRM where you had no right to replace SIM without mobile operator permission. But when the mobile operators tried to replicate the same model on the East (Russia, Ukraine, etc) they failed. Government was not effective and so the technical side of DRM protection was tested. It failed spectacularly. Unlocking procedure was widely available and most phones had the ability to change IMEI too. Yes, you needed some hardware but if there are hundred clients per day... prices were quite affordable. Today that's not true anymore: because mobile operators basically capitulated: they are not major mobile phones sellers so there are no need to unlock anything! Even rare phones sold by mobile operators are usually sold unlocked. It does not look like "DRM has won" to me. It only "won" in countries where government spent a lot of taxpayers money to guarantee that mobile operators will be able to get monopoly rent. Hardly looks like hardware "win" to me. P.S. And as "you need an electron microscope just to see individual elements"... Again: chip duplication technology was widely available and used in USSR - it just become economically unviable when USSR fell. If someone needs the keys - they can be pulled from any TPM chip (including Sandy Bridge). But yes, it's expensive option and as long as government spends significant effort to make sure it's up to hobbyists DRM works for a few years.
Please tell the story... Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:15 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>Do tell. It should be interested story because as I'm seeing it DRM was employed by mobile for years and never worked without government enfocement.
It turned out that DRM just has to be shiny and people will buy it. That's what Apple did with their AppStore. It doesn't look like it's DRM, but in fact it is. They have ability to yank any application off your phone, so in future expect no third-party media player on iPhone which allows you to bypass DRM.
Ooops. Future is actually already here: http://apple.slashdot.org/story/11/01/07/2341227/Apple-Pu... And people STILL buy iCrap (ok, their hardware is nice, I admit it).
Finally removing ability to root your phone will just be an incremental step once good DRM implementation will be tested on next-gen consoles.
>P.S. And as "you need an electron microscope just to see individual elements"... Again: chip duplication technology was widely available and used in USSR - it just become economically unviable when USSR fell.
But that was way back in the past, when a simple optical microscope was enough. It's just not possible now, regardless of your motivation and finances. It's literally easier to invade Intel factory and steal designs.
This is hardly a success story.... Posted Jan 8, 2011 22:18 UTC (Sat) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] It turned out that DRM just has to be shiny and people will buy it. That's what Apple did with their AppStore. It doesn't look like it's DRM, but in fact it is. They have ability to yank any application off your phone, so in future expect no third-party media player on iPhone which allows you to bypass DRM. The DRM on iCrap work the same way it did with DVD, Dreamcast, or, indeed PS3: there are locked systems and people are buying the content for it, but it only makes lives of honest but shortsighted people miserable yet huge number of people is just using "jailbroken" systems (earlier they were called "cracked" systems) and don't have such problems. Finally removing ability to root your phone will just be an incremental step once good DRM implementation will be tested on next-gen consoles. Does not work this way. There are more then enough people who'll just drop iPhone if they can not jailbreak it. PS3 is last console in the race for a reason. Sure, if all other phone makers decide that they want to lock down their phones too it'll be the end of story, but I fail to see locked down iFones in near future. But that was way back in the past, when a simple optical microscope was enough. It's just not possible now, regardless of your motivation and finances. Why do you think it's impossible now? Sure, optical microscope is not enough but there are new instruments available. Think about it: if the chip can be produced it can be scrutinized for if there are no way to control the end result there are no way to make the whole machinery work! The very fact that chip exist and works means there are means to disassemble it! In fact you need significantly more capable tools to control the manufacturing process in comparison to what you need to pull the key from the hardware. The tools required are quite expensive nowadays but the capability remains. It's literally easier to invade Intel factory and steal designs. It depends. You don't know what is developed where so you'll need a lot of work to find our who and where exactly keeps the information you need. Of course if you can find a collaborator it may be much easier and simpler...
This is hardly a success story.... Posted Jan 9, 2011 0:48 UTC (Sun) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>The DRM on iCrap work the same way it did with DVD, Dreamcast, or, indeed PS3: there are locked systems and people are buying the content for it, but it only makes lives of honest but shortsighted people miserable yet huge number of people is just using "jailbroken" systems (earlier they were called "cracked" systems) and don't have such problems.
Yet when faced with a choice to abandon the shiny next version of their device or live with DRM, most users chose DRM. PS2 was the most hacked console ever, but users happily switched to PS3 which (for now) is immune to hacking.
>Does not work this way. There are more then enough people who'll just drop iPhone if they can not jailbreak it.
>PS3 is last console in the race for a reason.
>Why do you think it's impossible now? Sure, optical microscope is not enough but there are new instruments available. Think about it: if the chip can be produced it can be scrutinized for if there are no way to control the end result there are no way to make the whole machinery work!
Nope, please, learn a bit about how chips are developed. Debugging fab machinery and development of chip circuit are completely separate processes.
Of course, you'll use simple designs to debug manufacturing processes. But by the time you tape out the real CPU design your machinery must already be flawless because each run of fabrication can easily cost you millions of dollars and months of time.
>The very fact that chip exist and works means there are means to disassemble it!
>In fact you need significantly more capable tools to control the manufacturing process in comparison to what you need to pull the key from the hardware. The tools required are quite expensive nowadays but the capability remains.
Again, no. Have you ever looked at a netlist for a moderately complex circuit? It's even worse than assembly language listing.
This is hardly a success story.... Posted Jan 9, 2011 14:04 UTC (Sun) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] Yet when faced with a choice to abandon the shiny next version of their device or live with DRM, most users chose DRM. PS2 was the most hacked console ever, but users happily switched to PS3 which (for now) is immune to hacking. Sorry, but no. PlayStation 2 was leader of it's generation. Combined sales of other sixth generation consoles (Dreamcast, Gamecube, XBox) are less then half of PlayStation2 sales! Yet PlayStation3 was and is #3 this time. And it's not longer immune to hacking: just like with PlayStation2 most programs are emulators and backup loaders, but there are other programs too. The most hacked console this generation is Wii - and it's the most popular, again. >Does not work this way. There are more then enough people who'll just drop iPhone if they can not jailbreak it. Not enough to do what? Bankrupt Apple? Probably not. Guarantee that iCrap will have more open alternative? Of course there are enough such people. >PS3 is last console in the race for a reason. Funny that. How come it was not important before? Nintendo 64 was cheaper then PlayStation - yet it lost, Nintendo GameCube was cheaper then PlayStation 2 - yet it lost again. But this time around price of PlayStation 3 is suddenly the deciding factor? Nope, please, learn a bit about how chips are developed. Good advice - you should follow it. Debugging fab machinery and development of chip circuit are completely separate processes. This is PR bullshit. Yes, this is what foundries are preaching, but it does not work this way. When you move from one fab to another or, even worse, from one foundry to another you often need to change the masks to fix problems found in test run. Of course, you'll use simple designs to debug manufacturing processes. But by the time you tape out the real CPU design your machinery must already be flawless because each run of fabrication can easily cost you millions of dollars and months of time. What a load of bull! When was the last time you've participated in chip development? It's either millions of dollars or months of time. But not simultaneously. You don't need full run to test your masks. Typical price of run for single wafer is measured in thousand dollars, not millions, but yes, it takes months. You may expedite it and get the result in two weeks - but in this case price may be closer to million of dollars. Then you can take your wafer, make chips, test them and do another run. Sometimes problems are obvious, but sometimes they are not obvious and you need to actually look on the chip to find our what went wrong. And yes, you can not see everything with optic nowadays so take a look step may be expensive too. I'm yet so see ASIC which worked without glitches on first try. Even if you tested it extensively on emulators and with FPGA - you still usually need two or three runs before you'll get production quality. Note: quite often few masks from the set are changed (to save the costs) when ASIC is debugged - do you really think it'll be possible to do blindly without knowing what goes on in the actual chip? No, there are no means to do it. Sorry. Funny but this is exactly what we did when TSMC screwed up five years ago. I admit that I've only ever worked with emulator and was not the one who found out TSMC incorrectly injected ARM core in our chip and this was the reason the whole thing refused to start, but I know how it's done from experience. Again, no. Have you ever looked at a netlist for a moderately complex circuit? It's even worse than assembly language listing. Have you looked on assembly code of a moderately complex game? Yet people crack them in days, rarely it takes more then few weeks. For hardware you need expensive machinery, not $500 general purpose computer so it takes longer, but it's still possible. This is the question of cost, not ability. You are correct if you say that to pull a key from hardware easily may require millions of dollars - but to say that's just not possible... sorry, the technology does not work this way. Fundamental reason for DRM failure is ages old truth: You may fool all the people some of the time, you can even fool some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all the time. TPM used to secure HDD works because to crack each HDD you'll need man-years of work and millions of dollars - and usually it's just not worth it. DRM works for some time because each time new version of DRM is introduced crackers need to investigate it - and it does not happen overnight. But to make bullet-proof DRM you must fool all of the people all the time - and this is just impossible.
This is hardly a success story.... Posted Jan 9, 2011 15:29 UTC (Sun) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
> Sorry, but no. PlayStation 2 was leader of it's generation. Combined sales of other sixth generation consoles (Dreamcast, Gamecube, XBox) are less then half of PlayStation2 sales! Yet PlayStation3 was and is #3 this time. And it's not longer immune to hacking: just like with PlayStation2 most programs are emulators and backup loaders, but there are other programs too. The most hacked console this generation is Wii - and it's the most popular, again.
And the cheapest. And most innovative (until Kinect had been released).
>Funny that. How come it was not important before? Nintendo 64 was cheaper then PlayStation - yet it lost, Nintendo GameCube was cheaper then PlayStation 2 - yet it lost again. But this time around price of PlayStation 3 is suddenly the deciding factor?
Yes.
>This is PR bullshit. Yes, this is what foundries are preaching, but it does not work this way. When you move from one fab to another or, even worse, from one foundry to another you often need to change the masks to fix problems found in test run.
We're talking about TPM built into the state-of-the art CPUs, remember.
>What a load of bull! When was the last time you've participated in chip development? It's either millions of dollars or months of time. But not simultaneously. You don't need full run to test your masks. Typical price of run for single wafer is measured in thousand dollars, not millions, but yes, it takes months. You may expedite it and get the result in two weeks - but in this case price may be closer to million of dollars.
And how are you going to MAKE this wafer? Photomasks can easily cost millions for the current generation processes ( http://www.rdmag.com/Featured-Articles/2004/06/Building-a... ). Most of the cost here is equipment - it can literally cost tens of millions, and one photomask can easily take more than 24 hours to be etched and you typically need 20-30 of them. So do the math.
And yes, photomask validation is a routine step. But it is done on specialized tools, costing tens of millions of dollars. And these tools still can't do the reverse scanning, they basically compare your reference design with the manufactured photomask.
So reverse engineering something like Intel CPU will probably cost you at least 20-30 millions of green paper bills. And that's a conservative estimate - at that rate it's really easier to hire a mercenary army and invade Intel factory.
/me goes back to writing workarounds for a buggy ASIC because there's no money for yet another round of fabrication. Grumble grumble.
Well, we are going in circles, so the I think it's time to stop Posted Jan 9, 2011 17:19 UTC (Sun) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] We're talking about TPM built into the state-of-the art CPUs, remember. No, we are talking about DRM, remember. And you wrote these words, remember: And that reason is "price". State-of-the art is expensive. If you employ state-of-the-art technology you'll either go bankrupt or lose the market. By the time DRM reaches the consumer it must be implemented using years-old-technology - or it'll not work. So reverse engineering something like Intel CPU will probably cost you at least 20-30 millions of green paper bills. Sure, but you don't need to reverse-engineer the whole CPU. You only need to find the place where top-secret key is kept. It's still expensive, but not THAT expensive. It's the same as with software design: to fully reverse-engineer PowerDVD you'll need years but to find where the beast keeps it's keys you need days.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 19:58 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
unless they hard-wire a different certificate into each and every chip (which would mean that every chip was really unique), the certificate is stored somewhere. Wherever it's stored can be read and written to.
it has to be modifiable or if there is a problem on the signing side the vendor has no ability to update the system to accept a new signing key.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:05 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>unless they hard-wire a different certificate into each and every chip (which would mean that every chip was really unique), the certificate is stored somewhere. Wherever it's stored can be read and written to.
TPMs are designed to be written exactly one time (during manufacture). After that the certificate part is read-only. That's quite easy to do electronically, so I don't think TPM designers are lame enough to leave a hole like this.
>it has to be modifiable or if there is a problem on the signing side the vendor has no ability to update the system to accept a new signing key.
TPMs can't be updated. If there's a problem that requires for the master certificate to be replaced, you're screwed.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:09 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
eventually there will be a case where the master certificate needs to be replaced.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:17 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
Why? So far TPMs have a perfect score.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:24 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
no they don't
look at the tivo, it implemented TPM (signed bootloader, signed firmware, signed kernel, signed userspace) I've had mine hacked for over 10 years.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:27 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
That's not TPM (aka Trusted Platform Module).
TPMs are hardware modules that can do signature validation and decryption. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module
Working _around_ TPM is not a "TPM hack".
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 22:53 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
on my tivo, what actually happens is the bios gets re-written to disable the TPM features.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 0:30 UTC (Sun) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
Yep. That's "working around" TPM, it's certainly doable.
However, imagine now that you need TPM to decrypt the video stream and TPM module is built into the CPU. What are you going to do?
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 0:40 UTC (Sun) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
that's a different definition of TPM than I am familar with.
TPM as i understand it concentrates of making sure that the system is running only 'good' software, by having the hardware validate the bootloader, the bootloader validate the kernel, etc. This chains the trust of the hardware up to the software.
using a piece of hardware to do the decryption of content does not seem to fall into this category.
having a piece of hardware that is locked down that does the decryption with the intent of preventing the user from accessing the content otherwise seems to fall in the definition of DRM.
TPM can be used to lock down a device that then implements DRM, but they are separate types of tools.
forgive me for being a bit pedantic here, but I believe that it is important to keep the definitions straight.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 1:16 UTC (Sun) by foom (subscriber, #14868) [Link]
Yes, but the TPM could have "sealed" the keys the video is encrypted by, thus making you unable to decrypt your videos without the TPM enabled (and having verified your Tivo as running only "good" software).
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 6:27 UTC (Sun) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
where could TPM have these 'sealed' keys? they can't be in the hardware (especially if that can't be modified after manufacture)
if they are in the software they are accessable, if by no other means than by letting it get decoded and then reading the ram directly.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 9:47 UTC (Sun) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>where could TPM have these 'sealed' keys? they can't be in the hardware (especially if that can't be modified after manufacture)
In the changeable part of internal memory. It's not like TPMs are _completely_ immutable.
>if they are in the software they are accessable, if by no other means than by letting it get decoded and then reading the ram directly.
They are not in software.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 20:05 UTC (Sat) by jmorris42 (subscriber, #2203) [Link]
> Look at Blueray.
BlueRay made one mistake, they trusted Microsoft. When they started Vista was supposed to be built around a TPM and Blueray would only be made available on hardware with one. Then the industry politics shifted and Vista shipped without TPM and Sony was left with three bad choices, no BD on Windows, require some sort of insane hardware spec that would keep the Precious away from the main CPU by doing all the work in the drive and passing it out some sort of link directly to the video card or do what they did and use a software player. Once they released a Windows app that could play a BD they die was cast, game over.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 21:32 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
Yeah, once your secret keys are on a general-purpose computer - you can say 'bye-bye' to them.
The problem is, we're moving away from general purpose computers towards specialized devices for consuming (sic!) media. Like iPads.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 23:05 UTC (Sat) by dlang (✭ supporter ✭, #313) [Link]
the ipad is actually a pretty general purpose computer.
a kindle is a specialized device (although it's being opened up and turning into a more general purpose device with the SDK)
I see the trend a bit differently.
each nich starts off with very specialized devices, but over time they gain more and more capabilities, trending towards a general purpose device.
phones are a good example of this, they were very dedicated devices, now people are happy that they can connect them to a TV for display and a bluetooth keyboard/mouse for input, and connect removable storage (flashcards), at that point what is the phone other than a small general purpose computer?
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 11, 2011 12:45 UTC (Tue) by azouhr (subscriber, #40022) [Link]
> Not really. Integrated circuits are not "reverse-engineerable" now,
> especially when you need an electron microscope just to see individual > elements. Even if you have a gate list for an IP-core (analog of a > binary-only module) reverse-engineering is close to impossible for > anything non-trivial.
Just have a look at
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 11, 2011 12:51 UTC (Tue) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
>>"The MiFare chip was first introduced in 1994. At the time, the security level was very high," he said in an interview. "The 48-bit key lengths for encryption was state of the art."
Yeah, that's a real modern CPU. You can also cite 6502 project as an example ( http://www.visual6502.org/ ) - just look, they've managed to reverse the whole 3510 transistors.
Now they only need to scale it to 2,300,000,000 transistors and they'll be ready to reverse-engineer SandyBridge-era CPUs!
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 21:52 UTC (Fri) by gidoca (subscriber, #62438) [Link]
It does not prevent copying, but DRM could in theory be used to create software which only runs on a single device. The media would need to be specially created for your device then, of course.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 7, 2011 22:08 UTC (Fri) by clugstj (subscriber, #4020) [Link]
Well, yes, DRM is used to control who gets to make software for the machine.
But more importantly in this context is that the DRM prevents anyone (who doesn't have the key) from modifying the software to allow it to run from alternate media (DVD-RW/USB stick/harddrive). This is what makes it feasible to pirate the games. Of course, this ability can be used for perfectly legitimate purposes, but Sony and the game makers won't see it that way.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 1:03 UTC (Sat) by jonabbey (subscriber, #2736) [Link] It's trivially easy to just take the DVDROM with the legitimately signed software on it, run it through a machine with a DVDRW, and make a bit-for-bit copy. That copy will then run just fine, since it's legitimately signed and everything. Not on the PS3. The Blu-Ray consortium specified something called BD-ROM MARK which is an area of data that cannot be written to by BD-R drives, but can only be stamped by duplication machines. The BD-ROM MARK area includes a key required to decrypt the contents of the Blu-Ray disc. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROM-Mark That could presumably be circumvented by modifying the firmware on the Blu-Ray drive, with the cryptographic materials located elsewhere on the disc surface, or entered manually, but no one has done this that I'm aware of.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 12:19 UTC (Sat) by robert_s (subscriber, #42402) [Link]
Indeed, in fact even DVD had (has) a similar sector not writable by recorders. It's where the CSS key was stored. This is why the CSS system had to be cryptographically cracked before people could copy DVDs. People couldn't simply copy the data bit-for-bit to the new disc.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 12:52 UTC (Sat) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]
DVDs were perfectly easy to copy in-bulk, bit-by-bit, prior to deCSS. Just not with regular, western consumer-level DVD recording equipment... If it can be manufactured, and if the means of manufacture are not strictly controlled, then it will be copied.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 15:46 UTC (Sat) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]
But manufacture IS strictly controlled. Only a handful of companies produce BR-drives.
Yup - and this is the REAL reason why PS3 was unbroken for 4 years... Posted Jan 8, 2011 19:00 UTC (Sat) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] Yup. That means bootleg factories can not duplicate PS3 titles anyway - and this made PS3 not very interesting for "black hats". Of course the same tight control meant torrent-capable HD-players outsell BD-capable HD-players by significant margin so the win is Pyhrric.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 9:12 UTC (Sat) by nhippi (subscriber, #34640) [Link]
Fundamentally, yes, when you give users the content and key needed to open the content, you haven given means to copy to the content as well. Thus DRM can only slow down the process.
Despite a glaring error in Sony DRM, it still stopped piracy on PS3 for 4 years from the launch. It did serve its purpose for a good portion of PS3 lifecycle.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 22:31 UTC (Sun) by AndreE (subscriber, #60148) [Link]
To consider the DRM scheme successfull, you have to know how much it cost to implement, and how long it protected the system.
With regards to 1:
With regards to 2:
A platform that relies so much on games and developement licenses as its profit driver really can't consider an expensive DRM scheme that was cracked for 50% of it's lifetime a "win"
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 10, 2011 9:18 UTC (Mon) by nhippi (subscriber, #34640) [Link]
Please enlighten us on why do you think xbox360 DRM was less complex or cheaper to implement for Microsoft than ps3 drm for sony?
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 10, 2011 16:23 UTC (Mon) by khim (subscriber, #9252) [Link] It's funny how intelligent people forget to check the facts. Somehow lots of guys when talk about consoles say that XBox360 "sells like hot cakes" and PlayStation3 "is complete failure". If they live in US, that is. And this is true, to the extend. But if you ask people from Japan... PlayStation3 will be "quite a success" and XBox360 "total failure". But if you compare worldwide sales? 41.6 million for PlayStation3 vs 44.6 million for XBox360. Note: thus is despite the fact that XBox360 was available year earlier then PlayStation3! The question about #2 console of seventh generation is still in the air... In reality DRM in XBox360 is quite extensive and, probably, expensive: latest Linux-compatible models were produced 1.5 years ago. Even Wii includes pretty serious DRM-protection - and I suspect Nintendo spends sizable sums trying to lock down the console (as people behind PS3 crack noted: 3 years, 9 software updates, 8 include no new features - only fixes to DRM... still easily crackable after all these years). But the fact remains: Wii is most easily crackable console (was cracked two weeks after release and was not closed for more then two weeks since) and it has tons of homebrew... yet it's #1 console if this generation. I think drag is quite correct: it does not matter if DRM works or not. As long as you can not legally sell games for Wii/XBox360/PS3 it "works as intended" - it exist not to protect games from pirates but to protect Microsoft, Nintendo, and SONY from sales of unauthorized games.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 12:52 UTC (Sat) by Los__D (guest, #15263) [Link]
Sooooo, how come noone did this to PS3 games for more than 4 years?
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 8, 2011 16:50 UTC (Sat) by teknohog (guest, #70891) [Link]
Perhaps in part because Linux hackers were happy with OtherOS. Notice how quickly the hacks started pouring in when OtherOS was removed.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 15:26 UTC (Sun) by AlexHudson (subscriber, #41828) [Link]
Microsoft effectively killed it off on Xbox360 in August 2009 - no hacks can get around that as yet, and even before that it required hardware mods in addition.
I don't know how the 360's system ranks against Playstation 3's in the wider context of preventing pirated software, but it certainly seems more effective at preventing Linux and/or homebrew software.
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 9, 2011 16:07 UTC (Sun) by foom (subscriber, #14868) [Link]
Maybe that just goes to show that the best way to keep linux off your console is to make it so that being able to pirate software for it doesn't also imply being able to run linux? :)
PlayStation 3 hack - how it happened and what it means (The Guardian) Posted Jan 11, 2011 12:57 UTC (Tue) by azouhr (subscriber, #40022) [Link]
Did I understand so little of that video, or is "The Guardian" simply wrong with some quite important facts?
The subtitle states that the doors to piracy would have been opened, which is an epic fail of "The Guardian" because it is wrong. People did not even try to gain the keys that would be necessary to do piracy.
The only thing they did is enabling the owner/user of a PS3 to run their own software on the PS3 without limitation. Thus it is just a regain of what Sony originally promised to their customers - and even without the need to do any modifications to the box. I don't know if this is right in the letters of law, but it is definitly ok in terms of morale.
a technical talk is available as video from 27C3 conference Posted Jan 13, 2011 15:50 UTC (Thu) by giggls (subscriber, #48434) [Link]
A recording of the relevant 27C3 talk is available on the following URL:
http://mirror.fem-net.de/CCC/27C3/mp4-h264-HQ/27c3-4087-e...
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