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Spengler: False Boundaries and Arbitrary Code ExecutionSpengler: False Boundaries and Arbitrary Code ExecutionPosted Jan 5, 2011 21:18 UTC (Wed) by gmaxwell (subscriber, #30048)Parent article: Spengler: False Boundaries and Arbitrary Code Execution
Some of the escalations listed related to root owning most system binaries thus the lack of DAC_OVERRIDE being irrelevant for a EUID 0 process being able to modify most of them.
Is there any particular reason that all system binaries, except SUID ones, couldn't be changed to be owned by another user which processes never run as ("bin" perhaps?). Since root normally has DAC_OVERRIDE this shouldn't have a ton of administrative impact but it would reduce that family of loopholes a little bit.
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Spengler: False Boundaries and Arbitrary Code Execution Posted Mar 3, 2011 7:30 UTC (Thu) by roblucid (subscriber, #48964) [Link]
I don't like the sound of that idea. What programs can root safely run?
IMO root risks privilege escalation via a trojan, any time they execute non-root owned code. In past under UNIX, many binaries were owned by 'bin', but this just meant gaining user 'bin' was another way to root the box.
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