> in the article you spent a lot of time talking about how the user can
> still get at the local disks, and my point is that that really doesn't
and my point is that it *does* matter ... whether malware exists today that roots around on the local disks for information of interest, or to alter the installed OS, doesn't really matter -- though i suspect there are isolated cases of that kind of malware out there already ...
the organization sponsoring LPS is set up to protect the data of the DoD, which may well reside on the local disks and/or the USB stick ... if DoD employees are using this at home or on their laptops as some sort of "secure web browser", and have local data of interest, there is a problem, no?
and if we are protecting against nation-state class attacks, those actors developing targeted malware to access or modify that local data is most certainly in the cards ...
i guess i didn't miss your point, i just disagree :)