Yeah, great link. People don't have enough fear about their terminals. Some of the more horrific terminal codes that do things like open files in your home directory have been removed from xterm and rxvt (no idea about others) but it's by no means safe to just allow random characters to be written to your screen and it hasn't been even back to physical terminals.
Allowing write to write to your terminal is a security problem though I think talk filters out control characters. Running any program even as an unprivileged user with no filesystem access is a problem if the output is going to your terminal. Just cating a file from an unknown source is an issue. Running a program on an unsanitized input might cause it to print error messages or other strings without stripping out special characters.
Basically the terminal is full of security issues because it obeys control characters no matter how they get there and traditionally lots of stuff gets written to your screen from unsanitized sources.
Instead of changing the filesystem to fix a very small part of that (and let's face it, if you have something writing out malicious filenames, it's probably writing out malicious file contents), there should be a more comprehensive approach. For example, there could be a mechanism to add a tty filter process which could sanitize the output for your specific terminal. Ideally the terminal program would set it up before starting the shell (console and remote logins would need to be handled too, and remote logins are harder because the terminal type isn't known until login, if ever). The hard part is that you want some control characters to get through -- and probably different ones from different sources (setting the xterm title in your shell prompt code for example). There would need to be a way to get different interfaces for the shell, trusted programs, and untrusted programs. How to do this without redesigning the shell and all the utilities? :(