True. But I'm also worried about the "removes ALL boundaries" claim. I don't know btrfs or the algorithms well enough to do the math, but the claim is, essentially, that btrfs may, in the pathological case, consume an infinite amount of space, for actually storing nothing.
That is unlikely to happen for real workloads, but should still be impossible. Especially since pathological workloads can often be provoked deliberately by an attacker. (typical for race-conditions, for example, even race-conditions that would "almost never" happen in normal situations, become a problem if an attacker can deliberately create them)
Posted Jun 24, 2010 11:34 UTC (Thu) by nye (guest, #51576)
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I wonder how this interacts with quotas. Could a malicious user fill a quota with pathological files that actually use vastly more disk space? The alternative is that a user fills their quota without having anywhere near that much actual data.
Btrfs: broken by design?
Posted Jun 24, 2010 11:41 UTC (Thu) by NRArnot (subscriber, #3033)
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You can equally persuade ext2 to run out of space without storing any data Just create zero-byte files until it runs out of inodes!
Btrfs: broken by design?
Posted Jun 24, 2010 12:08 UTC (Thu) by ekj (guest, #1524)
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You're still storing something: you're storing the metadata. (at a minimum, the filenames and permissions)
But you're right, that (pathological) case is likely the lower bound for utilization in ext2.
Btrfs: broken by design?
Posted Jun 24, 2010 20:50 UTC (Thu) by intgr (subscriber, #39733)
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> until it runs out of inodes
Not really -- that's why ext2 also has inode quotas/file quotas.