By Jake Edge
March 3, 2010
Fedora already has a number of variations—called "spins"—to
support different use cases: alternative desktops (KDE, LXDE, XFCE),
gaming, hardware design, education, etc. Starting with Fedora 13, those
will be joined by the Fedora Security Lab (FSL),
which is meant to be a "safe test-environment for working on
security-auditing, forensics and penetration-testing, coupled with all the
Fedora-Security features and tools". The target audience is much
the same as that of the BackTrack
security distribution—security professionals along with those who
want to learn about various security techniques.
FSL is based on the LXDE desktop environment because of its small resource
footprint, which will leave more memory available for running various
security and forensic tools. The LXDE menu has been customized to present
a categorized list of tools and applications available to a user. The
distribution comes with a fairly extensive list
of packages, as well as a wish list of
additional packages that would be added to FSL once they are packaged for
Fedora.
The release itself will be an ISO image that can be used as a Live CD,
which can then be installed on the hard disk. A more likely scenario is
creating a bootable system on a USB stick using Fedora's liveusb-creator. That
will allow the user to reserve some extra space on the USB stick for
persistent storage. That storage can be used for installing additional
packages or storing the output or configuration of various utilities so
that they are
available after each boot.
Fedora's Joerg Simon is leading the FSL effort, which got final
approval from the Fedora advisory board in mid-February. FSL provides a
number of advantages for Fedora and its users—many of which are
listed on the FSL page—but there is one item in particular that Simon
seems to be excited about: using it as a platform to teach about security.
Simon has slides
[PDF] from a presentation he gave that proposed FSL as the basis for
teaching classes based on the Open
Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM). Simon is involved
in both projects and sees benefits to both from a collaboration. FSL would
provide a stable platform that teachers and students could rely upon and
Fedora would benefit from the wider exposure those classes would bring.
In addition to the various utilities and tools that are packaged with
the spin, FSL also showcases the security
features that are part of all Fedora spins. Things like SELinux,
default firewall rules, PolicyKit, and various protections like stack
smashing protection, buffer overflow protection, and so forth, are all
available for students and others to examine and play with.
Having a larger parent organization like Fedora—and to some extent
Red Hat—may help FSL achieve a higher-profile than BackTrack or other
security distributions have in the past. One can imagine that FSL will be
the tool of choice for recovery of
broken systems in the Fedora and RHEL worlds, as users will already be
familiar with the underlying distribution. Working with other
organizations that are targeting security education is another thing that
may very well help foster FSL as a tool of choice for security
professionals.
While FSL is somewhat late to this particular party, and still has a number
of important tools (Metasploit, OpenVAS, SiLK, etc.) on its wish list,
it does have the infrastructure and user community of Fedora behind it.
There is ample room for collaboration with BackTrack and other
security-focused distributions—one hopes that can come about. By
sharing information, configuration, tools, and techniques, in much the same
way that free software development is done, better security distributions
will result. That can only help bring about increased security for all
free software.
Comments (8 posted)
Brief items
This ars technica article describes how Microsoft took down the control structure for the Waledac botnet. "
By obtaining the restraining order, this command-and-control system was disrupted; with the domain names offline, the machines in the botnet were no longer able to locate their control servers, rendering them mostly harmless. The court action had to be taken in secret to avoid warning the botnet's operators; with sufficient warning, they might have been able to set up new domain names and new control systems, thereby circumventing Microsoft's efforts. The names have now been offline for three days, presumably sufficient to cause permanent disruption, and the injunction is now public."
Comments (none posted)
New vulnerabilities
apache: unknown vulnerability
| Package(s): | apache httpd |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2010-0408
|
| Created: | March 3, 2010 |
Updated: | September 14, 2010 |
| Description: |
The mod_proxy_ajp module packaged with Apache 2.2.x suffers from an unknown vulnerability when faced with a protocol error. |
| Alerts: |
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Comments (1 posted)
apache-mod_security: denial of service
| Package(s): | apache-mod_security |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | February 26, 2010 |
Updated: | March 3, 2010 |
| Description: |
From the Openwall
report:
multiple security flaws, which might lead to bypass of intended
security restrictions and denial of service, have been reported
and corrected in latest v2.5.12 version of ModSecurity. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel: denial of service
| Package(s): | kernel |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | February 25, 2010 |
Updated: | March 3, 2010 |
| Description: |
From the Pardus alert:
A vulnerability has been fixed in Kernel, which can be exploited by
malicious people to crash kernel due to divide by zero in
azx_position_ok.
Using mp3blaster-3.2.5 (latest version) to play MP3 audio, the reporter
was able to crash the kernel by stopping and restarting playback using
the "5" key repeatedly. This happens as a normal user, not only as root. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kvm: privilege escalation
| Package(s): | kvm |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2010-0419
|
| Created: | March 2, 2010 |
Updated: | June 4, 2010 |
| Description: |
From the Red Hat advisory:
A flaw was found in the way the x86 emulator loaded segment selectors (used
for memory segmentation and protection) into segment registers. In some
guest system configurations, an unprivileged guest user could leverage this
flaw to crash the guest or possibly escalate their privileges within the
guest. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
puppet: insecure tempfile creation
| Package(s): | puppet |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2010-0156
|
| Created: | March 2, 2010 |
Updated: | June 14, 2010 |
| Description: |
From the Red Hat bugzilla:
puppet may create several predictable files in /tmp, e.g.
/tmp/daemonout
/tmp/puppetdoc.txt
/tmp/puppetdoc.tex
|
| Alerts: |
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Comments (none posted)
samba: denial of service
| Package(s): | samba |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2010-0547
|
| Created: | March 1, 2010 |
Updated: | September 23, 2011 |
| Description: |
From the Debian advisory:
Jeff Layton discovered that missing input sanitising in mount.cifs
allows denial of service by corrupting /etc/mtab.
|
| Alerts: |
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Comments (none posted)
sudo: unintended privilege escalation
| Package(s): | sudo |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2010-0426
CVE-2010-0427
|
| Created: | February 26, 2010 |
Updated: | October 27, 2010 |
| Description: |
From the Red Hat advisory:
A privilege escalation flaw was found in the way sudo handled the sudoedit
pseudo-command. If a local user were authorized by the sudoers file to use
this pseudo-command, they could possibly leverage this flaw to execute
arbitrary code with the privileges of the root user. (CVE-2010-0426)
The sudo utility did not properly initialize supplementary groups when the
"runas_default" option (in the sudoers file) was used. If a local user
were authorized by the sudoers file to perform their sudo commands under
the account specified with "runas_default", they would receive the root
user's supplementary groups instead of those of the intended target user,
giving them unintended privileges. (CVE-2010-0427)
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| Alerts: |
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Comments (none posted)
Page editor: Jake Edge
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