Re: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface. (v2) [LWN.net]

From:		Valdis.Kletnieks-AT-vt.edu
To:		Michael Stone <michael-AT-laptop.org>
Subject:		Re: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface. (v2)
Date:		Thu, 17 Dec 2009 23:43:58 -0500
Cc:		Mark Seaborn <mrs-AT-mythic-beasts.com>, linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org, netdev-AT-vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module-AT-vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <andi-AT-firstfloor.org>, David Lang <david-AT-lang.hm>, Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan-AT-hartkopp.net>, Alan Cox <alan-AT-lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Herbert Xu <herbert-AT-gondor.apana.org.au>, Bryan Donlan <bdonlan-AT-gmail.com>, Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr-AT-ioremap.net>, "C. Scott Ananian" <cscott-AT-cscott.net>, James Morris <jmorris-AT-namei.org>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-AT-xmission.com>, Bernie Innocenti <bernie-AT-codewiz.org>, Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap-AT-oracle.com>, AmÃ©rico Wang <xiyou.wangcong-AT-gmail.com>
Archive-link:		Article, Thread

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:29:57 EST, Michael Stone said:
> Daniel Bernstein has observed [1] that security-conscious userland processes
> may benefit from the ability to irrevocably remove their ability to create,
> bind, connect to, or send messages except in the case of previously connected
> sockets or AF_UNIX filesystem sockets. We provide this facility by implementing
> support for a new prctl(PR_SET_NETWORK) flag named PR_NETWORK_OFF.

Dan does indeed have a point - but is this better achieved via either
the already-existing LSM interfaces (opening the stacking-LSM can of worms
again), or the SECCOMP framework?  We already have 2 other ways to turn off
stuff, do we really want a third way?

Alternatively, could a more generalized prctl interface be leveraged to handle
SECCOMP, and/or other targeted things that want to stack with LSM?

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