Can anyone give an example of some kind of malicious access that this could prevent but the excellent Postgres permission structure could not? Especially since they took out row-level labels. Maybe I don't get it.
Posted Dec 6, 2009 17:32 UTC (Sun) by Los__D (guest, #15263)
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Since SE-PgSQL only uses SELinux as a rights database, I think the idea is to reduce the amount of security interfaces admins has to work with, not to remove attack vectors.
SELinux and PostgreSQL: a worthwhile union?
Posted Dec 7, 2009 2:22 UTC (Mon) by kaigai (subscriber, #12001)
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> Can anyone give an example of some kind of malicious access that this
> could prevent but the excellent Postgres permission structure could not?
It allows SELinux to perform a logical-wall to separate each virtual-hosts
in a single tenant. However, it also has flexibility to share partial
tables or files across virtual domains, unlike virtualization.
SELinux and PostgreSQL: a worthwhile union?
Posted Dec 10, 2009 9:10 UTC (Thu) by smurf (subscriber, #17840)
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I'd hope that row-level access control will get back in, once the core feature has landed.
Any kind of multi-customer database can benefit from that. Last year I had to tell a customer that converting his single-client database solution to multi-client wasn't possible without major redesign. With row-level access control I'd have been able to make them happy (and me too, by billing them for a month or so of work ;-) ).