Posted Nov 22, 2009 17:01 UTC (Sun) by Cyberax (subscriber, #52523)
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Well, if I had a choice between ASN.1 and insanely complex XML rules, then I'd still choose XML.
The trick in doing XML dsig is to output XML directly in a canonical format, then you can have a pretty fast implementation.
It's still slower than uber-optimized ASN.1 parsers, but personally, I don't care even if it's 10x slower.
TLS renegotiation vulnerability
Posted Nov 23, 2009 0:17 UTC (Mon) by foom (subscriber, #14868)
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> Well, if I had a choice between ASN.1 and insanely complex XML rules, then I'd still choose XML.
That's a bit silly. Have you ever looked at ASN.1? It's really quite trivial. So much easier than XML,
it's hard to imagine why anyone would want to use an XML parser instead in security sensitive
code.
Posted Nov 23, 2009 8:26 UTC (Mon) by Cyberax (subscriber, #52523)
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Unfortunately, I've worked with it. And that's why I'm quite sure: wherever ASN.1 goes, destruction and pain follows. Examples: LDAP, SNMP, SSL/TLS, Kerberos.
To be fair, XML canonicalization rules are designed for arbitrary XML. It's possible to simplify them by using a subset of XML. For example, by restricting entities, CDATA and namespace use.
In any case, less complex formats like JSON can be used instead of XML.
TLS renegotiation vulnerability
Posted Nov 23, 2009 13:50 UTC (Mon) by quotemstr (subscriber, #45331)
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