Posted Nov 20, 2009 0:44 UTC (Fri) by gmaxwell (subscriber, #30048)
[Link]
At least suid is trivially auditable (find!) and there is decades of established practices, policy, and procedures in dealing with it. I can walk into any library or bookstore and find books on securing systems that cover the subject of SUID binaries and that knowledge and experience is generally portable, not just to all GNU/Linux distributions but across unixes in general.
Eliminating SUID by replacing it with controls buried in a windows-registry like database isn't necessarily an improvement.
People's reaction to this is just stupid.
Posted Nov 20, 2009 1:21 UTC (Fri) by drag (subscriber, #31333)
[Link]
Eliminating SUID by replacing it with controls buried in a windows-
registry like database isn't necessarily an improvement.
Not always, of course. But I think in the case of policykit and the other
*kits it is.
This is simply because it should be unnecessary to perform normal desktop
operations without resorting to running privileged code under a user's
account. These things eliminate that for common cases.
I don't think that sudo/su should be eliminated for everything. It should
be reserved as a administrative tool and users should only be required to
be prompted for the root password or run root code under their account in
special cases. I think that in the cases of installing/updating software is
such a mundane and everyday event that invoking root password or running
code as root is diminishing the security of the typical desktop scenario
when a alternative exists.
Now for managed desktops then that sort of activity should be forbidden,
which is easy enough to accomplish through packagekit/policykit.
(also I don't consider storing policy as XML files in directories to be
anything like what the negative things the windows registry does...)
I do think that having this default spread to _all_ user accounts by
default is a bad idea, though.