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A trojan for SkypeA trojan for SkypePosted Sep 3, 2009 11:24 UTC (Thu) by Tet (subscriber, #5433)Parent article: A trojan for Skype Since we don't really know what the Skype code does when it isn't infected, it will be difficult to determine if its behavior changes in a malicious way. That should be a little worrisome. Agreed. That said, a decent SELinux policy can prevent it from doing undesireable things on the local box, even if it's infected. It's hard to stop it sending copies of your calls out over the network, though, because skype needs to send data over the network, and SELinux doesn't have an easy way of working out which are legitimate network connections and which aren't.
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A trojan for Skype Posted Sep 3, 2009 17:53 UTC (Thu) by droundy (subscriber, #4559) [Link]
Also note that a SELinux policy is unlikely to keep skype from sending audio and video even when you aren't on the network... it's not just your calls that might be compromised, but anything you mention (or do) in the presence of a computer running skype. Of course, network usage is likely to give this away, unless a trojan were to store up data and send it during a call...
A trojan for Skype Posted Sep 4, 2009 20:42 UTC (Fri) by Tet (subscriber, #5433) [Link] a SELinux policy is unlikely to keep skype from sending audio and video even when you aren't on the network... it's not just your calls that might be compromised, but anything you mention (or do) in the presence of a computer running skypeThat's not really true. A decent policy can prevent a rogue skype process from reading files that it has no business reading, so the only things it should be able to transmit is data it already has (e.g. the audio of your call)
A trojan for Skype Posted Sep 5, 2009 19:25 UTC (Sat) by oak (subscriber, #2786) [Link]
> so the only things it should be able to transmit is data it already has
(e.g. the audio of your call)
If it's allowed to read the mic for the call, why it couldn't eavesdrop
A trojan for Skype Posted Sep 14, 2009 11:11 UTC (Mon) by robbe (guest, #16131) [Link]
> If it's allowed to read the mic for the call, why it couldn't eavesdrop
> you always?
You could probably modify your policy on the fly to allow/deny access to
But as an X app it has a lot of means to snarf information, anyway ... or
I think the best option today is a VM sandbox. Or a free alternative.
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