The only thing that was fixed when the exploit was written was the tun.c bug, which was fixed with no mention of any security impact (understandable since I had opened up yet another bug class as being exploitable). Everything else was fixed either in response to obvious hints/statements in videos I released a week prior to the exploit, or in response to the exploit itself.
Still waiting on anyone from Red Hat/Fedora to report a CVE for the SELinux issue and tell their users how long they've been vulnerable to null ptr dereference kernel exploits because of it.
Posted Jul 25, 2009 12:40 UTC (Sat) by nix (subscriber, #2304)
[Link]
I'm curious: since they've said they don't think it's a bug (more an
expected tradeoff: if you run SELinux without useful policy this is what
you get, and no, I don't agree with that either), why would *they* give it
a CVE?
Speaking with code
Posted Jul 25, 2009 12:53 UTC (Sat) by spender (subscriber, #23067)
[Link]
Well, perhaps because they asked me to cancel the CVE request I put in (which I still haven't gotten a response from) so that they would submit their own:
Brad Spengler wrote:
>> Let me get back to you on this.
>
> I've contacted the relevant people to request a CVE for the issue, as
> the previous bypass of mmap_min_addr was given a CVE back in 2007; this
> should be no different.
Thanks Brad.
Can you cancel the request? I will assign one (faster), and provide you
with the proper credits in the errata.