Apache attacked by a "slow loris"
Posted Jun 25, 2009 4:29 UTC (Thu) by
quotemstr (subscriber, #45331)
In reply to:
Apache attacked by a "slow loris" by michaeljt
Parent article:
Apache attacked by a "slow loris"
So you're talking about having Apache implement TCP in userspace? That makes no technical sense whatsoever. The kernel implementation is thoroughly debugged, mature, patched regularly, and faster to boot. Apache will have to maintain just as much state as it does today, and moving TCP to userspace solves nothing.
A "socket" is just a handle to a tiny bit of state information describing the connection, and of course it's the right abstraction. It's what the protocol is specified to use, and in-order, streamed delivery is the perfect medium for HTTP anyway.
The real problem here is what Apache does after it reads data from a socket. Recall that both lighttpd and IIS use sockets (just like every other network daemon on Earth), and they are not vulnerable to this attack.
The counter to this attack is simple, really, and it's conceptually the same as a counter to a SYN flood: only commit your resources when the remote party has committed his own. The problem here is how to shoehorn that idea into Apache's model, which commits resources (in this case, processes) very early.
Here's one uninformed idea: accept connections and read HTTP requests in one master process, asynchronously. Only when a complete request has been read send the file descriptor of the connection to a worker; the actual handoff can be achieved using a SCM_RIGHTS over a unix domain socket.
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