Dangerously wrong? [LWN.net]

Dangerously wrong?

Posted Jun 18, 2009 22:09 UTC (Thu) by jmayer (subscriber, #595)
Parent article: Dealing with weakness in SHA-1

Disclaimer: I'm not a cryptographer, just an interested reader who may
understand things incorrectly.

The statement "Even with the easier-to-exploit MD5 collision problem,
[...] the closest anyone has come is to generate two keys that can be
used to create the same signature; an attack with little practical
value." seems to be dangerously wrong: This attack has been successfully
exploited in a place where it could do maximum damage to everyone still
using MD5:
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ (MD5 considered harmful today
- Creating a rogue CA certificate)
So with the recent breakthrough on SHA-1 attacks and things like openCL
allowing highly parallel computations on $200 graphics GPUs: Isn't the
same attack doable with SHA-1 now?

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Dangerously wrong?

Posted Jun 19, 2009 14:33 UTC (Fri) by n8willis (editor, #43041) [Link]

This is a discussion of the differences on the GnuPG list: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2009-May/036...

Nate