|| ||Linus Torvalds <torvalds-AT-linux-foundation.org> |
|| ||"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-AT-xmission.com> |
|| ||Re: [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
|| ||Mon, 4 May 2009 15:24:15 -0700 (PDT)|
|| ||Arjan van de Ven <arjan-AT-infradead.org>, Jake Edge <jake-AT-lwn.net>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris-AT-namei.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis-AT-redhat.com>,
Alan Cox <alan-AT-lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland-AT-redhat.com>, mingo-AT-redhat.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm-AT-linux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg-AT-kroah.com>, Matt Mackall <mpm-AT-selenic.com>|
|| ||Article, Thread
On Mon, 4 May 2009, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Arjan van de Ven <firstname.lastname@example.org> writes:
> > On Mon, 4 May 2009 12:00:12 -0700 (PDT)
> > Linus Torvalds <email@example.com> wrote:
> >> On Mon, 4 May 2009, Jake Edge wrote:
> >> >
> >> > This is essentially v2 of "[PATCH] proc: avoid leaking eip, esp, or
> >> > wchan to non-privileged processes", adding some of Eric Biederman's
> >> > suggestions as well as the start_stack change (only give out that
> >> > address if the process is ptrace()-able). This has been tested
> >> > with ps and top without any ill effects being seen.
> >> Looks sane to me. Anybody objects?
> > Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Looks sane here.
> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <email@example.com>
Also, does anybody have any commentary or opinion on the patch by Matt
Mackall to use stronger random numbers than "get_random_int()". I wonder
what the performance impact of that is - "get_random_int()" is very cheap
by design, and many users may consider calling "get_random_bytes()" to be
overkill and a potential performance issue.
Quite frankly, the way "get_random_bytes()" works now (it does a _full_
sha thing every time), I think it's insane overkill. But I do have to
admit that our current "get_random_int()" is insane _underkill_.
I'd like to improve the latter without going to quie the extreme that
matt's patch did.
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