Re: What can OpenVZ do?
[Posted February 25, 2009 by jake]
| From: |
| Ingo Molnar <mingo-AT-elte.hu> |
| To: |
| Dave Hansen <dave-AT-linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
| Subject: |
| Re: What can OpenVZ do? |
| Date: |
| Tue, 17 Feb 2009 23:23:19 +0100 |
| Message-ID: |
| <20090217222319.GA10546@elte.hu> |
| Cc: |
| Andrew Morton <akpm-AT-linux-foundation.org>, linux-api-AT-vger.kernel.org,
containers-AT-lists.linux-foundation.org, hpa-AT-zytor.com,
linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org, linux-mm-AT-kvack.org,
viro-AT-zeniv.linux.org.uk, mpm-AT-selenic.com, tglx-AT-linutronix.de,
torvalds-AT-linux-foundation.org, xemul-AT-openvz.org,
Nathan Lynch <nathanl-AT-austin.ibm.com> |
| Archive-link: |
| Article, Thread
|
* Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2009-02-13 at 11:53 +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > In any case, by designing checkpointing to reuse the existing LSM
> > callbacks, we'd hit multiple birds with the same stone. (One of
> > which is the constant complaints about the runtime costs of the LSM
> > callbacks - with checkpointing we get an independent, non-security
> > user of the facility which is a nice touch.)
>
> There's a fundamental problem with using LSM that I'm seeing
> now that I look at using it for file descriptors. The LSM
> hooks are there to say, "No, you can't do this" and abort
> whatever kernel operation was going on. That's good for
> detecting when we do something that's "bad" for checkpointing.
>
> *But* it completely falls on its face when we want to find out
> when we are doing things that are *good*. For instance, let's
> say that we open a network socket. The LSM hook sees it and
> marks us as uncheckpointable. What about when we close it?
> We've become checkpointable again. But, there's no LSM hook
> for the close side because we don't currently have a need for
> it.
Uncheckpointable should be a one-way flag anyway. We want this
to become usable, so uncheckpointable functionality should be as
painful as possible, to make sure it's getting fixed ...
> We have a couple of options:
>
> We can let uncheckpointable actions behave like security
> violations and just abort the kernel calls. The problem with
> this is that it makes it difficult to do *anything* unless
> your application is 100% supported. Pretty inconvenient,
> especially at first. Might be useful later on though.
It still beats "no checkpointing support at all in the upstream
kernel", by a wide merging. If an app fails, the more reasons to
bring checkpointing support up to production quality? We dont
want to make the 'interim' state _too_ convenient, because it
will quickly turn into the status quo.
Really, the LSM approach seems to be the right approach here. It
keeps maintenance costs very low - there's no widespread
BKL-style flaggery.
Ingo
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