| From: |
| David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
| To: |
| jmorris@namei.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, morgan@kernel.org |
| Subject: |
| [PATCH 0/7] Introduce credentials [ver #2] |
| Date: |
| Sun, 27 Jul 2008 15:02:08 +0100 |
| Message-ID: |
| <20080727140208.13888.87420.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> |
| Cc: |
| sfr@canb.auug.org.au, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org |
| Archive-link: |
| Article,
Thread
|
Hi James, Andrew, Stephen,
Here are the patches I'd suggest at least considering to send upstream now:
(1) The fix for PF_SUPERPRIV to prevent task->flags from being corrupted by
__capable().
(2) A patch to disperse linux/key_ui.h - it's unnecessary as keyfs went away.
(3) A patch to alter key instantiation to not alter the keyring subscriptions
of another process.
(4) A patch to neuter sys_capset() so that it can't alter another process's
capabilities.
Note that I've added in Andrew Morgan's suggestions to remove the use of
tasklist_lock to wrap the calls to the LSM capset hooks, and I've removed
the target pointer from those hooks. These are unnecessary as capset can
only affect current from this patch on.
(5) A patch to constify the kern_cap_t pointers in the capset security hooks.
(6) A patch to wrap most refs to fs[ug]id in macros so that COW creds can be
introduced later.
(7) A patch to wrap most refs to e?[ug]id in macros so that COW creds can be
introduced later.
These patches are against the head of Linus's tree. A tarball is available
here:
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/cred-for-linus-2.tar.bz2
David
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