What exec-protection mechanisms? I thought most of those were pushed upstream? (Things like
gcc's stack protection, address space randomization, non-executable stack, data and heap, etc.
are, no idea how much they were written by Red Hat in the first place though.) Only thing left
AFAIC was non-exec protection on non x86_64 x86.
That's what I like about Red Hat, that nowadays they push stuff upstream so that everyone
benefits from it. If distros would do that more they'd make each other's lives easier and
improve the whole.
Posted Jul 17, 2008 15:48 UTC (Thu) by nix (subscriber, #2304)
[Link]
Other parts of exec-shield, like the 'ASCII armoring' (to make it
impossible to embed the address of a function in a shared library in an
string and then get it into an overflowed string via C string-handling
functions) haven't gone upstream yet :( I wonder why not?
Ubuntu - poorer security than Fedora
Posted Jul 17, 2008 16:04 UTC (Thu) by riel (subscriber, #3142)
[Link]
IIRC Linus made it clear that he did not want them. I do not remember the reason, but it made
sense at the time :)
Ubuntu - poorer security than Fedora
Posted Jul 19, 2008 20:19 UTC (Sat) by ceplm (guest, #41334)
[Link]
All this stuff is unless when not used. What are the default CFLAGS in Ubuntu? The Red Hat
distros are known to use quite paranoid ones.
Ubuntu compile-time hardening
Posted Jul 21, 2008 8:33 UTC (Mon) by mdz@debian.org (subscriber, #14112)
[Link]
Posted Jul 21, 2008 8:51 UTC (Mon) by i3839 (guest, #31386)
[Link]
That isn't true, most is done by the kernel, only stack protection is useless when not
enabled, so buffer overflows are still a danger, but less if the kernel makes the stack
non-executable and randomizes the address space.
And as the poster below linked to, Ubuntu seems to enable those flags too.