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Not reallyNot reallyPosted Jul 10, 2008 13:39 UTC (Thu) by kh (subscriber, #19413)In reply to: Not really by jschrod Parent article: SELinux and Fedora
I have been thinking that the traditional Unix security model has strength because of its simplicity: 1) It is easy for any normal sysadmin to understand 2) It is easy to audit 3) It is easy to edit Maybe there is a wealth of tools and custom scripts out there for selinux that I am not aware of, but I do not think they exist because selinux is too difficult to completely conceptualize. I also do not understand why any type of selinux (or any other security) error should be anything other than noisy and verbose, especially when installed by default on a desktop. Does selinux give silently logged errors that should be ignored by an average user?
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Not really Posted Jul 10, 2008 14:20 UTC (Thu) by jschrod (subscriber, #1646) [Link] I agree with you mostly. Concerning the error messages, in my experience, it is even worse: Not only are they not sensible for an average desktop user, they are not even sensible for an experienced sysadmin user! Therefore, using SELINUX on a desktop system is doomed to cause great pains for the user community. (It bothers me only on an abstract level, though. On the desktop, I use SUSE... :-)) But I don't think that the traditional Unix security model (easy as it is) can survive in the long run. In our Internet-connected age the environment and associated threat model got more complex, and such simple solutions won't be adequate in the long run. But I don't have any idea how one can teach compartimentation and MAC to run-of-the-mill sysadmins and end-users who are forced to be their own sysadmins.
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