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The rest of the vmsplice() exploit storyThe rest of the vmsplice() exploit storyPosted Mar 6, 2008 20:05 UTC (Thu) by spender (subscriber, #23067)In reply to: The rest of the vmsplice() exploit story by fuhchee Parent article: The rest of the vmsplice() exploit story
The UDEREF feature of PaX prevents the kernel from accessing userland memory directly and has been doing so for 2 years now, close to a year before the vulnerability class ever became public. It makes use of segmentation on x86 to accomplish this, so due to Linus' rules it will never be accepted into the mainline kernel. -Brad
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The rest of the vmsplice() exploit story Posted Mar 6, 2008 20:11 UTC (Thu) by spender (subscriber, #23067) [Link] If you're interested, I had posted this information earlier regarding UDEREF to some mailing lists, courtesy of the PaX Team: http://grsecurity.net/~spender/uderef.txt -Brad
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